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UNCOVERING JUROR RACIAL BIAS
CHRISTIAN B. SUNDQUISTt
ABSTRACT

The U.S. Supreme Court in Peha-Rodriguezv. Coloradorecognized
for the first time in this Nation's history that trial courts could consider
post-verdict evidence of juror racial bias under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, notwithstanding the common law no-impeachment rule
and its federal counterpart (Federal Rule of Evidence 606). Trial courts
have nonetheless struggled with applying the Peha-Rodriguez framework, leading to inconsistent rulings on the types of juror statements that
amount to a "clear statement of racial bias" and when such racial bias
amounts to a "significant motivating factor" in the juror's decisionmaking process. While legal scholars have recommended pre-verdict
solutions such as modified jury instructions and voir dire questioning
following Peha-Rodriguez, scholarly guidance has not yet been given to
trial judges on how to identify juror racial bias in a post-verdict context.
This Article advances a post-verdict model for analyzing juror racial
bias, based on sociological and psychological empirical findings on the
nature of racism and the expression of cognitive biases. The model proposes a dynamic and flexible understanding of racial bias, while setting
forth an evidentiary procedure for analyzing PeFha-Rodriguez claims of
juror misconduct.
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INTRODUCTION

The presence of racial bias in the courtroom has the potential to undermine public faith in the adversarial process, distort trial outcomes, and
obfuscate the search for justice. In Pehia-Rodriguezv. Colorado' the U.S.
Supreme Court recently held for the first time that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required post-verdict judicial inquiry in criminal
cases where racial bias clearly served as a "significant motivating factor"
in juror decision-making 2 Courts nonetheless have struggled in interpreting what constitutes a "clear statement of racial bias" and whether such
3
bias constituted a "significant motivating factor" in the jury's verdict.
This Article examines how courts have interpreted such bias in the year
following Peila-Rodriguezwhile advancing a model for future judicial
analysis of racial bias that is informed by sociological and psychological empirical findings on bias and group decision-making dynamics.
The Article begins by examining how racial bias historically has
embedded itself in the American adversarial system and how modem-day race-based disparities in criminal justice are linked to this history. Part II of the Article examines the common law and statutory evolution of rules preventing impeachment of jury verdicts by extrinsic evidence, and analyzes the constitutional rationale for creating a "racial
bias" exception to those limits set forth in Peha-Rodriguez. This Part also
explores how state and federal courts both pre- and post-Peha-Rodriguez
have applied racial-bias exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, concluding that courts are struggling to understand the nature of racial bias in
their rulings. In particular, it finds that trial judges tasked with applying
the newly identified racial-bias exception may not have the requisite
training or knowledge to adequately identify when racial stereotypes are
influencing jury behavior. The third Part of this Article provides guidance to courts applying Peha-Rodriguez, based on the empirical findings
of sociological and psychological research on racial bias. This Part also
sets forth practical suggestions for courts to follow to assist with the
identification and interpretation of juror racial bias when faced with a
post-verdict Peha-Rodriguezmotion.

1.
2.
3.

137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
Id. at 869.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
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I. RACIAL BIAS IN THE COURTROOM

Racial inequality has long been a defining feature of the American
adversarial system.4 Our system of laws developed during a time when
the maintenance of chattel slavery was critical to the nascent country's

continued economic development.5 Our Constitution, with its guarantees
of "equality," "freedom," and the "pursuit of happiness," evolved at a
moment when explicit race-based restrictions to such legal freedoms
were upheld on the grounds of biological racial difference and denied
personhood. 6 Such naturalized racism-whereby differential legal treatment based on race was seen as both constitutional and reflective of the
natural order of humankind-thus embedded racial bias in the most central structures of our adversarial trial system. 7 The ability of nonwhite
litigants to access state and federal courts was largely restricted prior to
the end of chattel slavery, typically on the rationale that nonwhite persons were not full "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution and
thus not entitled to the full array of legal rights attendant to persons
deemed "white." 8 Black and other nonwhite persons were similarly restricted from entering into binding contracts, 9 from providing testimonial
evidence in court, ° or from seeking damages for legal injuries in court
during these formative years of America." Prosecutorial, judicial, and
aspect of the American trial
juror racial bias was an expressly legitimated
2
slavery.
chattel
of
era
the
system during
See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: Similari4.
ties and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 521 (1990).
5.

See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).

6.

See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (affirming the refusal of the

United States to allow the appellant to enter the United States because it was within the Legislature's
authority under the Constitution to exclude foreigners). For a historical account of race and its relationship to "personhood," the notion of an individual as a member in a political community, see
Christian B. Sundquist, Genetics, Race and Substantive Due Process, 20 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. &
SOC. JUST. 341, 352 (2014).
7.
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 187 (2012); DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:
THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 3, 5 (1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racism in American Courts: Cause
for Black Disruption or Despair,61 CALIF. L. REV. 165, 166 (1973).
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404, 411 (1857) (holding that because the peti8.
tioner was a slave of African descent, he was not considered a citizen and therefore could not bring
an action in court), supersededby constitutionalamendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

9.

See Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the

Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1,23-24 (1995).
See, e.g., SHERROW 0. PINDER, THE POLITICS OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED
10.
STATES: AMERICANIZATION, DE-AMERICANIZATION, AND RACIALIZED ETHNIC GROUPS 58 (2010)

(explaining that the 1850 Act Concerning Civil Cases, a California statute, established that "[n]o
Black or Mulatto person, or Indian, shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a white
man." (quoting People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 399 (1854))).
See GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE
11.
SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 52 (Negro Univs. Press 1968) (1856).

12.

See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 ("In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of

the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of
persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or
not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general
words used in that memorable instrument."); see also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,
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The fall of chattel slavery in this Country gave rise to a series of
constitutional amendments intended, ostensibly, to remove the stain of
slavery from the Constitution and ensure equality under the law for all
persons.' 3 The specific purpose of the "Reconstruction Amendments"
was thus to remove de jure structures of racial oppression, including the
elimination of "racial discrimination emanating from official sources in
the States."' 14 The entrenchment of racial discrimination in the adversarial
system was of particular concern as states began to resist the promise of
equality embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment by normalizing prosecutorial, judicial, and juror racial bias in the courtroom. 15 The U.S. Su606-07 (1889) ("The power of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in
its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated instances, and
never denied by the executive or legislative departments.").
13.
The Thirteenth Amendment was passed and ratified in 1865, abolishing slavery in the
United States. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified three years
later, established that "all persons bom or naturalized in the United States... are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside," and as such, granted African-Americans citizenship. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, codified the
right to vote. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."); see cases cited supra note 12. At the same time the amendments
were enacted, a series of regulations known as the "Black Codes," passed during the Presidency of
Andrew Johnson, continued to "prevent[] blacks from sitting on juries, [to] prohibit[] blacks from
voting, [to] limit[] blacks' testimony against whites, [and to] den[y] blacks the right to work in
certain occupations." See John D. Bessler, The Inequality ofAmerica s Death Penalty: A Crossroads
for Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 73 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 487, 521 n.122 (2017) (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BLACK STUDIES 120
(Molefi Kete Asante & Ama Mazama eds., 2005)). While these amendments were intended, perhaps,
to establish liberal equality in name, the overriding effect was nonetheless to maintain white supremacy through the implementation of race-neutral equality rights, without addressing the legacy
of the social and economic inequality left by slavery. See Bessler, supra, at 532-33.
14.
Peha-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) ("[The] imperative to purge
racial prejudice from the administration of justice was given new force and direction by the ratification of the Civil War Amendments. '[T]he central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States."' (second alteration in
original) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964)); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 127 (1970) ("[T]he Civil War Amendments were unquestionably designed to condemn and
forbid every distinction, however trifling, on account of race."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 306 (1879) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment] is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many
generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy."), abrogatedby
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71-72 (1872)
("[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in [the Civil War
Amendments], lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been
even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that
freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true that
each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and designed to remedy them
as the fifteenth."); see also supra note 13.
15.
See Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867 ("In the years before and after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it became clear that racial discrimination in the jury system posed a
particular threat both to the promise of the Amendment and to the integrity of the jury trial."); James
Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 909-10 (2004) ("Almost immediately after the Civil War, the South began a practice that would continue for many
decades: All-white juries punished black defendants particularly harshly, while simultaneously
refusing to punish violence by whites, including Ku Klux Klan members, against blacks .... ).
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preme Court eventually interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to disallow prosecutorial racial bias 16 and judicial bias 17 in the administration of
justice, to varying degrees of success.1 8 The Court also addressed racial
discrimination in the jury system in a series of important cases in an effort to preserve "the American belief that 'the jury was a bulwark of liberty."' 19 For example, the Court responded to the widespread state practice of excluding nonwhite persons from serving on juries in Strauder v.
West Virginia,20 holding that such practices amounted to a denial of
equal protection under the law.2 ' The Court also belatedly found, many
decades after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, that prospective jurors could be "interrogated on the issue of racial bias" during
the pretrial voir dire process.22 And more than one hundred years after
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held in Batson v.
Kentucky2 3 that the exclusion of prospective jurors because of race24
through peremptory challenges or other means-was unconstitutional.
It has taken another thirty-one years since Batson for the Court to recognize, in Peha-Rodriguez, that criminal defendants also have a constitutional right to examine whether juror racial bias infected a guilty verdict.2 5
It has proven difficult to shed the racial bias ingrained in the Ameri26
can adversarial process. Our laws are now largely race neutral in their
See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310 (holding that a West Virginia statute that discriminated "in
16.
the selection of jurors ... against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws to a colored man").
See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
17.
See Donald C. Nugent, JudicialBias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 34 (1994).
18.
19.
Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867-68 (quoting Forman, supra note 15, at 909).
20.
100 U.S. 303.
Id. at 310. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further responded to patterns of juror
21.
exclusion based on race. The Court elaborated in Smith v. Texas that "[f]or racial discrimination to
result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government." 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). See also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
492, 501 (1977); Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477, 479, 482 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S. 559, 561 (1953); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395 (1935) (per curiam); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880).
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973); see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S.
22.
28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that a criminal defendant, in a capital murder case where the defendant
and victim are of different races, has a right to question jurors about potential racial biases); RosalesLopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (holding that a trial court must examine racial bias
in certain criminal cases).
23.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 84-85 (stating that such a rule was part of the Court's "unceasing efforts to eradicate
24.
racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire from which individual jurors are
drawn"); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618, 630-31 (1991) (extending the Batson rule to civil trials).
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
25.
Racial bias continues to permeate all aspects of the adversarial process. Research has
26.
shown that "[j]udges detain black defendants at statistically higher rates than white defendants." See
Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction,and Discretion,81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 157, 199 (2013). Criticism of the Federal Rules of Evidence has suggested that while the rules are race-neutral in operation, they can be applied in a racially biased manner, subsequently giving race evidentiary value. See
Montr6 D. Carodine, "The Mis- Characterizationof the Negro ": A Race Critique of the Prior Con-
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language and application,27 while incremental progress has been made in
the identification of constitutional trial protections directed against racial
discrimination.28 And yet the fact that much of our law is no longer explicitly race regarding in its allocation of justice does not mean that racial
bias no longer contributes to disparate outcomes. 29 African-American
men receive federal prison sentences nearly 20% longer than white men
for similar convictions, 30 38% of prison inmates are African-American
despite constituting only 13% of the overall population, 3 1 and America
now "imprisons a larger percentage of its black population than South
Africa did at the height of apartheid., 32 The persistence, and at times
growth, of race-based disparities in our criminal justice system
has creat33
ed a democratic crisis with profound societal consequences.
The Supreme Court in Pefia-Rodriguez recognized the perilous
threat that continued racial bias in the administration of justice poses to
the perceived legitimacy of our criminal justice system. 34 In acknowledging the "unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns"
raised by the presence of "systemic" racial bias at trial, the Court underscored that allowing juror racial bias to persist unchecked not only runs
afoul of the trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments but also undermines the "promise of equal treatment under the law
that is so central to a functioning democracy. ' '3 5
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON JUROR RACIAL BIAS

Remarkably, evidence of juror racial bias has long been held to be
inadmissible to impeach a jury's verdict, even when there was reason to
believe that such bias influenced jury deliberations in reaching a guilty
viction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 536 (2009). Another study has found that defendants
with "more Afrocentric features received harsher sentences than those with less Afrocentric features." See Irene Blair et. al, The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing,
15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 674 (2004).
27.
See Sundquist, supra note 6, at 369. For a comprehensive analysis and timeline of the
evolution of race as it related to the creation and application of law, see Christian B. Sundquist, The
Meaning of Race in the DNA Era: Science, History and the Law, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL.
L. 231,231-33 (2008).
28.
See Nugent, supra note 18, at 45.
29.
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 7 (providing in-depth analysis of the role that the
criminal justice system plays in perpetuating racial discrimination).
30.

AM.

CIVIL

LIBERTIES

UNION,

RACIAL

DISPARITIES

IN

SENTENCING

1

(2014),

https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr racialdisparities aclu submissionO.p
df.
31.
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
16-17
(2d
ed.
2008),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Reducing-Racial-Disparity-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System-A-Manual-forPractitioners-and-Policymakers.pdf.
32.
ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 6.
33.
See Jeff Guo, America Has Locked up So Many Black People It Has Warped Our Sense of
Reality,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
26,
2016),
https ://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/26/america-has-locked-up-so-manyblack-people-it-has-warped-our-sense-of-reality.
34.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867-68 (2017).

35.

Id. at 867-69.
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36
The
verdict (almost always rendered against nonwhite defendants).
common law and statutory basis for the historical rejection of racial-bias
37
evidence has its roots in the "no-impeachment" rule. The common law
no-impeachment rule provided that jury verdicts could not be impeached
by extrinsic evidence, such as juror testimony, to preserve verdict finality
and the confidentiality of jury deliberations. 38 Over time the common law
no-impeachment rule, some version of which had been adopted by a majority of state courts, was codified as a matter of federal statutory law so
as to prevent "inquiry into the jury's deliberative process or the grounds
for its decision., 39 Congress adopted Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975, which reflected a broad view on the types of evidence
4°
that should be prohibited from impeaching a jury verdict. The rule provides as follows:

During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred
during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's
or another juror's vote; 4or any juror's mental processes concerning
1
the verdict or indictment.
The rule also provides that a "court may not receive a juror's affi42
although it
davit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters,
incorporates a handful of narrow-and narrowly construed-exceptions
to this broad prohibition:
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any
juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.43
While a number of minority state and federal courts construed these
exceptions (in particular, focusing on the "extraneous prejudicial inforracial bias, 44
mation" exception) to permit post-verdict evidence of juror
the majority of jurisdictions excluded such evidence prior to the PeSee United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, 560
36.
F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Pehia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855; Williams v. Price, 343
F.3d 223, 239 (3d Cir. 2003), abrogatedby Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855; Smart v. Folino, No.
3:CV-10-1447, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43582, at *22-25 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2015).
See Mark Cammack, The JurisprudenceofJury Trials: The No Impeachment Rule and the
37.
Conditionsfor Legitimate Legal Decisionmaking, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 58 (1993).
See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-69 (1915); Mattox v. United States, 146
38.
U.S. 140, 148-49 (1892).
Cammack, supra note 37.
39.
See Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864.
40.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
41.
Id.
42.
Id. 606(b)(2).
43.
See United States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 769-70 (6th Cir. 2017); Shillcutt v. Gagnon,
44.
827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987); Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1154-56 (D.C. 2013).
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ha-Rodriguez revolution.4 5 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court had long
narrowly interpreted when the Rule 606(b) exceptions applied, often
leading to surprising results. In Tanner v. United States, 46 the Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to admit post-verdict juror testimony concerning alleged juror intoxication at trial. 47 While there was evidence that
many of the jurors "drank alcohol," "smoked marijuana," "fell asleep,"
and even ingested cocaine during trial, the Court rejected the defendant's
argument that the Sixth Amendment required an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether he received his right to a competent jury. 4 8 The Court
reasoned that allowing such evidence would undermine "all frankness
and freedom of discussion and conference" and would "disrupt the finality of the process., 49 The Tanner Court also referenced existing trial safeguards, such as juror voir dire and the ability of jurors to report misconduct during trial, as sufficiently protecting criminal defendants' Sixth
5°
Amendment rights to a competent jury.
The Court again adopted a hardline interpretation of Rule 606(b) in
Warger v. Shauers.5 1 The civil plaintiff in Warger argued that postverdict juror evidence was permissible, notwithstanding the prohibition
set forth by the no-impeachment rule and Rule 606(b), to probe whether
one of the jurors concealed prodefendant bias during jury selection. 52 The
Court again held that the no-impeachment rule prevented such a postverdict inquiry, providing that "[e]ven if jurors lie in voir dire in a way
that conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately assured by the parties'
ability to bring to the court's attention any evidence of bias before the
verdict is rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is rendered. 5 3 The Warger Court at least recognized that an exception to the no-impeachment rule could exist in situations involving "juror
bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been
54
abridged.
A number of state courts and federal circuits believed,
pre-Peha-Rodriguez, that evidence of juror racial bias satisfied the
Warger exception of "extreme bias," and thus allowed trial judges to
consider such evidence to impeach otherwise final verdicts. 55 The ap45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865.
483 U.S. 107 (1987).
Id. at l10, 127.
Id. at 115, 125.
Id. at 120, 140.
Id. at 127.
135 S. Ct. 521, 524 (2014).

52.
53.

Id. at 524, 528.
Id. at 529.

54.
Id. at 529 n.3.
55.
See, e.g., United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 88 (1st Cir. 2009); Kittle v. United
States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1154-56 (D.C. 2013); State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 14-22 (Conn. 1998);
Fisher v. State, 690 A.2d 917, 920-21, 920 n.4 (Del. 1996); Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d
354, 357-58 (Fla. 1995); Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991); see also
United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119-21 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding "persuasive those cases
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proach of these courts, however, conflicted with the strict interpretation
of the no-impeachment rule adopted by many other state and federal
courts, setting the stage56 for the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the
long-lasting circuit split.
A. Pefia Rodriguez and the JurorRacial-BiasException
The Supreme Court finally addressed the circuit split by recognizing
a narrow exception to the no-impeachment rule for cases involving juror
racial bias. 57 In Pehia-Rodriguez, the Court held-in a close 5-4 decision-that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments created a constitutional
exception to the no-impeachment rule in cases involving "clear statea "significant motivating
ment[s]" of juror racial bias where that bias was
58
factor" in the biased juror's decision-making.
The case arose from the criminal prosecution of Miguel Angel Pefia-Rodriguez on a variety of sexual assault and harassment charges
brought in Colorado state court. 59 The Prosecution alleged that PehaRodriguez had "made sexual advances" towards two teenage sisters in a
bathroom located at a horse-racing facility where Pefia-Rodriguez was
employed as a horsekeeper. 60 After reporting the incident to their father,
the sisters then identified Pefia-Rodriguez as the assailant to law enforcement authorities. 6 1 Prosecutors thereafter charged Pefia-Rodriguez
with one count of unlawful sexual contact, one count of sexual assault on
62
a child, and two counts of harassment. A jury was empaneled for the
defendant's criminal trial, with no evidence of juror racial bias apparent
during voir dire questioning.63 At trial, Pefia-Rodriguez presented an alibi
defense, with a friend testifying that Pefia-Rodriguez was with him at the
time of the incident and thus could not have been the person who as64
saulted the sisters in the bathroom. The Prosecution did not present any
physical evidence against Pefia-Rodriguez at trial, but relied entirely on
the victims' pretrial and in-court identifications of Pefia-Rodriguez as

that have exempted evidence of racial prejudice from Rule 606(b)'s juror competency doctrine" but
not deciding in favor of or against the exemption); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1158-60 (7th
Cir. 1987) (stating that fairness may require a racial-bias exception on occasion).
See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1239-41 (10th Cir. 2008), reh 'g denied, 560
56.
F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2009), abrogatedby Pefla-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017); Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 237-39 (3d Cir. 2003); Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 37374 (5th Cir. 1981).
Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
57.

58.

Id. at 860, 869.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 861.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015), rev'd, 137 S.Ct. 855.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 295 n.3.
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their assailant. 65 He was ultimately convicted on the unlawful sexual
contact and harassment charges after a three-day jury trial.6 6
Following the guilty verdict, two jurors remained in the courtroom
to speak with Pefia-Rodriguez's attorney in private. 6 7 The jurors revealed
that one of the other jurors-Juror H.C.-had made a series of statements expressing racial bias against Pefia-Rodriguez-who was of Mexican ancestry-during jury deliberations. 68 The jurors, through sworn
testimony, attested that Juror H.C. had stated that:
*

he "believed the defendant was guilty because, in [H.C.'s] experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men had a
bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they
wanted with women";

*

he believed that Mexican men were "physically controlling of
women because they have a sense of entitlement";

*

he stated that the defendant "did it because he's Mexican and
Mexican men take whatever they want";

*

in his experience "nine times out of ten Mexican men were
guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls"; and

*

he found the defendant's alibi witness to not be credible because
the witness was "an illegal" (despite evidence that the witness
69
was actually a legal resident of the United States).

Pefia-Rodriguez moved for a new trial on the grounds that the
statements by Juror H.C. evinced anti-Mexican racial bias that undermined his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury.70
The trial court, however, rejected his motion on the basis that statements
made during jury deliberations were protected from post-verdict judicial
inquiry by Colorado's version of the no-impeachment rule.71 The trial
65.
People v. Pefia-Rodriguez, 412 P.3d 461, 465 (Colo. App. 2012), affid, 350 P.3d 287,
rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 855.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 465-66.
69.
Id. at 466.
70.
See id.
71.
Id. The Colorado no-impeachment rule is remarkably similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b). Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) (2016) provides:
[I]nquiry into validity of verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information
was improperly brought to the jurors' attention, (2) whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering
the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the
juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.
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court's decision was upheld by both Colorado's Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court.7 2 Notwithstanding that the statements made by Juror
' 74
H.C. were recognized as "repugnant ' 3 and "ideologically loathsome,
the Colorado courts reasoned that they were prohibited from considering
post-verdict evidence of juror racial bias given the need to "ensure that
the privacy of jury deliberations remains sacrosanct" under the Tanner
standard. 5 In particular, the Colorado Supreme Court felt as though
Tanner and its progeny had not recognized a "dividing line between different types of juror bias or misconduct" in applying the no-impeachment
rule.76
In a majority opinion penned by Justice Kennedy and joined by Jus77
tices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, holding that a "racial-bias" constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule should be
recognized. 78 The majority's opinion relied heavily on the history and
purpose of the Civil War Amendments, most notably the Fourteenth
Amendment, to "purge racial prejudice from the administration of justice.,, 79 The Court took stock of our Nation's long historical practice of
jury discrimination against African-American and other nonwhite criminal defendants, detailing disparate, race-based criminal justice outcomes
due to jury gerrymandering and blatant discrimination in the jury selection and voir dire process. 80 The Court thus rightly determined that the
"unmistakable principle" underlying the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is that "[p]ermitting racial prejudice in the jury system" undermines both public faith in the jury system and a criminal defendant's
81
impartial jury.
constitutional "protection of life and liberty" by an

COLO. R. EVID. 606(b).
See Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017).
72.
Colorado v. Pefia-Rodriguez, 412 P.3d at 470, aff'd, 350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015), rev'd,
73.
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
Pefia-Rodriguez,350 P.3d at 291.
74.
Id. at 293.
75.
Id.
76.
Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 860. Justice Kennedy retired summer 2018. Michael D.
77.
Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES, (June 27, 2018),
Jushttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retire-supreme-court.htm].
tice Kennedy's replacement, Justice Kavanaugh, could potentially give the Court reason to revisit its
ruling in Pehia-Rodriguez. See Jess Bravin, Brett Kavanaugh's Complicated History with Racial
Preferences, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brettkavanaughs-complicated-history-with-racial-preferences- 1536073245.
Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870-71.
78.
Id. at 867 (observing that "the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
79.
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States" (quoting McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964))).
Id. at 867-68 (citing seminal Fourteenth Amendment cases such as McCleskey v. Kemp,
80.
481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at
192; and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-09 (1880).
Id. at 868 (quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 310).
81.

DENVER LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 96:2

The Court, nonetheless, felt the need to balance the constitutional
protections provided to criminal defendants by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments for an impartial jury free from racial bias against its
long-standing commitment to the no-impeachment rule as embodied by
the Tanner and Warger precedents.8 2 The Court did so by distinguishing
such precedents as involving anomalous instances of egregious behavior,
such as juror drug and alcohol use in Tanner and prodefendant bias in
Warger, whereas juror racial bias involved "a familiar and recurring
evil" that risked "systemic injury to the administration of justice. 8 3 The
traditional trial safeguards for an impartial jury, such as voir dire questioning and pre-verdict juror reports, were found to be inadequate to root
out juror racial bias given, in part, the stigma that attaches in reporting
racism. 84 The disagreement between the slim majority of five and the
dissenters can be partly traced to competing worldviews concerning the
prevalence of systemic racism. While the majority views juror racial bias
as a "recurring" and "systemic" problem that therefore cannot be ameliorated by traditional ad hoc trial mechanisms, 85 the dissenters are more
prone to view racial bias as aberrational and individualized.8 6 The persistence of juror racial bias in the criminal justice system, however, has
been substantially demonstrated and calls into question the very possibil87
ity of "equal treatment under the law" in a "functioning democracy.
According to the majority in Peha-Rodriguez,not all evidence of juror racial bias would necessarily implicate the Constitution. Only a
demonstration that "one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt
racial bias," such as evidence that a juror made a "clear statement that
indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a
criminal defendant," would permit a court to engage in a post-verdict
inquiry into the fairness of the verdict. 88 Even if defendants were able to
discover evidence that one or more jurors made a "clear" or "overt"
statement of racial bias under this test, they would still be required to
demonstrate that the juror's racial bias "was a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict" 89-that is, that the existence of the
statement(s) "cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the
jury's deliberations and resulting verdict." 90 As such, the Court estab82.

[d.

83.

Id.

84.
Id. at 868-69 (noting that juror reporting of racial bias may be inhibited by concerns of
stigma and that directed voir dire questioning of racial bias could be ineffective at discovering juror

biases due to stigma or may even exacerbate such bias).
85.
See id.
86.
See id. at 882-83 (Alito, J., dissenting).
87.
Id. at 868 (majority opinion).
88.
Id. at 869. A discussion concerning the processes social scientists use to identify racial
bias will take place infra at Part III of this Article. This Part will also describe the various types of
racial bias identified in the literature and the controversy concerning whether "unconscious bias" has
been empirically validated.
89.
Pefia-Rodriquez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.

90.

Id.
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lished a relatively high bar for defendants to pursue post-conviction investigations into juror racial bias: they must (1) produce evidence that a
juror or jurors made a clear statement of racial bias and (2) that said
statement was a significant motivating factor in that juror's decision to
convict. 91 As applied to the facts in Peha-Rodriguez, the Court held that
the juror statements "were egregious and unmistakable in92their reliance
on racial bias," thus justifying post-verdict judicial inquiry.
The recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pefia-Rodriguez that
criminal defendants, at the very least, 93 have a limited right to
post-verdict examination of evidence of juror racial bias was not only
long overdue but also frustratingly incomplete. Given the pervasiveness
of racial bias in society, 94 as well as of that amongst jurors, 95 it was unfortunate that the majority in Peha-Rodriguez left the process for determining the presence of "clear" racial bias undefined and subject to the
discretion ef the trial court. 96 As others have observed, the failure to include specific procedural mechanisms by which to apply the newly found
likely lead to variability in both trial court rulracial-bias exception will
97
ings and just outcomes.

One question that arose immediately after Peha-Rodriguez was
whether the racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment rule was retroactive. The Court has indicated that evidence of juror racial bias could
serve as a basis for collateral review in the habeas context in Tharpe v.
Sellers,98 and that introducing evidence tinged with racial stereotypes
cnuld lead to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth
Amendment when seeking post-conviction relief in Buck v. Davis.9 9 The
petitioner in Tharpe cited the Court's recent decisions in both Pefia-Rodriguez and Buck as "new law" to support a motion to reopen his

See id.
91.
Id.at 870.
92.
At least one federal court has also applied the Pefia-Rodriguezracial-bias exception to the
93.
civil context. See Patton v. First Light Prop. Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-CV-1489-AJB-WVG, 2017 WL
5495104, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017), appealfiled, No. 17-56861 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2017).
While the Peha-Rodriguezholding is rooted partly in the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to an "impartial jury" in "all criminal proceedings," it is also supported by the Fourteenth Amendment's
promise that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws"-which applies equally in both civil and criminal trials.
Pehia-Rodriquez,137 S. Ct. at 868.
94.
See id. at 867-68.
95.

96.

Id. at 869.

See, e.g., Lauren Crump, Comment, Removing Race from the Jury Deliberation Room:
97.
The Shortcomings of Pefla-Rodriguez v. Colorado -id How to Address Them, 52 U. RICH. L. REV.
475, 476 (2018) (arguing for more "pre-deliberation safeguards" to prevent racial bias from seeping
into jury deliberations); Natalie A. Spiess, Comment, Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado. A Critical, but
Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending War on Racial Bias, 95 DENV. L. REV. 809, 840 (2018) (suggesting that modified jury instructions be implemented post-Peiia-Rodriguezto guard against juror
racial bias).
138 S. Ct. 545, 546 (2018) (per curiam).
98.
137 S. Ct. 759, 775-76 (2017).
99.
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claim for post-conviction habeas corpus relief.l0 0 Tharpe, an AfricanAmerican man who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
Georgia state court, introduced evidence that at least one of the white
jurors was racially biased during jury deliberations.10 1 In particular,
Tharpe introduced a sworn affidavit signed by the allegedly biased juror
that provided:
*

"there are two types of black people: 1. Black folks and
2. Niggers;"

*

the juror's statement that Tharpe "wasn't in the 'good' black
folks category in my book, [and] should get the electric chair for
what he did;"

*

"[s]ome of the jurors voted for death because they felt Tharpe
should be an example to other blacks who kill blacks, but that
wasn't my reason;" and

*

"[a]fter studying
the Bible, I have wondered if black people even
102
have souls."'

A lower federal district court dismissed Tharpe's motion on the
ground that it was procedurally defaulted because it failed to demonstrate
that he was prejudiced by the juror's bias; 03 in other words, Tharpe had
"failed to demonstrate that [the juror's] behavior 'had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."" 1° 4 In a
per curiam decision, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the above
statements presented "a strong factual basis" that racial bias influenced
the juror's verdict. 0 5 The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that it "was indisputable among reasonable jurists" that the juror's
racial bias did not prejudice Tharpe, finding instead that "[a]t the very
least, jurists of reason could debate" whether such bias had substantially
influenced the jury's verdict. 10 6 In so holding, the Court provided guidance to lower courts as to when statements of racial bias could reasonably be found to have influenced a jury's verdict: clear and explicit juror
statements of bias, which rely on racial stereotypes or slurs, should be
found by lower courts to "[a]t the very least" create a reasonable possi07
bility that racial bias influenced jury decision-making. 1

100.

Tharpe, 138 S. Ct. at 549 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

101.

Id. at 545-46 (majority opinion).

102.
103.

Id. at 546.
Id. at 545.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 546 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
Id.
Id.
See id.
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While it is unclear whether Peha-Rodriguez will be deemed by
1° 9
1 8
the
courts to be retroactive under the Teague v. Lane 0 standard,
Tharpe decision nonetheless indicates that evidence of juror racial bias
can be relied on in seeking post-conviction relief on habeas.
Another critical issue that arose following Peha-Rodriguez concerned the procedures that state and federal courts should use to determine whether a juror had made a "clear statement [of racial bias]" that
constituted a "significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict.,, 10 Justice Alito, in particular, argued in his dissent that "it will be
difficult for judges to discern the dividing line between those that are
'clear[ly]' based on racial or ethnic bias and those that are at least some'
Notwithstanding Justice Alito's dubious equating of
what ambiguous." 111
racial bias with sports-team bias in his dissent,' 12 it remains unclear following Peha-Rodriguezjust how trial judges are supposed to determine
the presence of juror racial bias that implicates the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.
In its majority opinion, the Court alluded that such a determination
should be "committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court in
light of all the circumstances, including the content and timing of the
alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered evidence."' 13 The
Court further provided that the "experience of [the seventeen 'jurisdictions that have recognized a racial-bias exception'] ...[should] inform
the proper exercise of trial judge discretion" as to whether the racial-bias

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
108.
Id. at 305-10 ("Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional
109.
rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the
new rules are announced." The two exceptions are (1) if the new rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,"
and (2) "if [the new rule] requires the observance of 'those procedures that ... are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."' (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting)). A decision in the Eleventh Circuit, Tharpe v. Warden, recently held that
the Peha-Rodriguez standard was not retroactive under the Teague standard. Tharpe v. Warden, 898
F.3d 1342, 1346 (11 th Cir. 2018) (finding that Peha-Rodriguez announced a procedural rather than
substantive rule, and thus did not satisfy the first retroactivity exception carved out in Teague).
However, the court in Tharpe v. Warden did not engage the second Teague exception-which allows
for retroactivity in cases announcing a "watershed rule of criminal procedure"-noting that the
petitioner did not make such an argument given that it is an "exceedingly high bar." See id. at 134546.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017). Justice Alito, in dissent, criti110.
cized the "racial bias" test. Id. at 884 (Alito, J., dissenting).
1l1. Id. at 884 (Alito, J., dissenting) Justice Alito used the curious example of a juror making a
reference to a Latino defendant as a "macho type," and remarking that "men of this kind felt that
they could get their way with women" as a potentially "ambiguous" statement. Id.
Justice Alito stated that allowing post-verdict inquiry for situations involving juror racial
112.
bias but disallowing such inquiry for other types of bias-such as "sports rivalries" where "a juror... expressed animosity toward the defendant because he was wearing the jersey of a hated
football team"-is "unsupportable under the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 883.
Id. at 869 (majority opinion). The Court also indicated that the process of acquiring such
113.
evidence of bias should be determined by both professional ethics and local court rules for juror
contact. Id.
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exception applies in a particular case.' 14 The Court nonetheless refused to
adopt a particular standard for determining whether its newly articulated
racial-bias exception has been satisfied, indicating that findings adopted
by other courts may well be sufficient: for example, whether racial bias
"pervaded the jury room"1 15 or that the presence of "[o]ne
racist juror
would be enough." ' 1 6 However, the Court did provide that "[n]ot every
offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting
aside the no-impeachment bar."'1 17 A brief review of the state and federal
decisions cited favorably by the Court may identify some clues as to how
courts should apply the racial-bias exception.
B. JudicialApplication of Peila-Rodriguez
The Court sided with decisions from the First, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits, as well as those from a scattering of lower state and federal
courts throughout the nation, in recognizing a constitutionally mandated
racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment rule.' 18 A review of those
cases, as well as of cases decided in the wake of Peha-Rodriguez, indicates that courts are nonetheless struggling to identify: (1) the evidentiary
procedures that should apply to flesh out alleged statements of racial
bias; (2) the appropriate standard of appellate review; (3) the types of
juror statements that trigger the juror racial-bias exception (e.g., which
statements evince racial bias?); and (4) when such statements of racial
bias likely significantly motivated juror decision-making.
1. The Process of Determining Juror Racial Bias
The Pefia-Rodriguez majority provided that the processes that could
be used by courts to rule upon a motion for a new trial based on alleged
juror racial bias should be left to the "substantial discretion" of trial
judges. 19 The Court did, however, note that such a post-verdict inquiry
should consider the statement "in light of all the circumstances," which
should include the "content and timing" of the statement(s) as well as an
assessment of the "reliability" of evidence of juror racial bias, acknowledging that such evidentiary practices will be shaped by local ethical and
120
court rules concerning post-verdict juror contact.
Courts applying a juror racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment
rule, both pre- and post-Peha-Rodriguez, have utilized devices such as

114.

Id. at 870.

115.
Id. at 871 (quoting Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987)).
116.
Id.(quoting United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001)).
117.
Id. at 869.
118.
See id.
at 865, 869. The Court went so far as to attach an Appendix to its majority opinion,
which listed judicial decisions, as of the publication of its opinion, that recognized some form of a
racial-bias exception. Id.at 886.
119.
Id. at 869.
120.

Id.
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123

22
21
witness examination,1 deposition testimony,
evidentiary hearings,'
and affidavits 124 to examine the presence of juror racial bias. The significant majority of state and federal courts that have conducted post-verdict
inquiries into juror racial bias have at the very least permitted a judicial
125
interview with the juror(s) reporting alleged racial bias, while a smaller number of courts have also required witness examination of the juror
126
At least
that allegedly made biased statements during deliberations.
two courts have recommended that the trial court conduct a witness examination of all empaneled jurors upon a sufficient allegation of racial
have resolved claims of juror bias based on
while other
bias, 127
128
alone.courts
affidavits
juror

The procedures adopted by courts, of course, are influenced greatly
the
internal rules governing the granting of new trials, post-verdict
by
evidentiary hearings, or both.129 For example, federal courts entertaining
a motion for a new trial based on alleged juror racial bias in criminal
cases will be guided by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.130 This
See United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d at 1113; Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1156
121.
(7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Smith, Crim. No. 12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *5 (D.
Minn. Apr. 24, 2018); Williams v. Price, No. 2:98cv1320, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213087, at *2 3
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2017); Fisher v. State, 690 A.2d 917, 919-20 (Del. 1996).
122.
United States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 767-78 (6th Cir. 2017); Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at
1159; Smith, 2018 WL 1924454, at *7; State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110 (R.I. 2013).
See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1113.
123.
See Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 546 (2018); Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1156-61; Smith,
124.
2018 WL 1924454, at *9; Commonwealth v. Laguer, 44 N.E.3d 869, 872-76 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016);
Brown, 62 A.3d at 1110.
See Fisher, 690 A.2d at 920; United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir. 2009);
125.
Henley, 283 F.3d at 1120; Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1159; Smith, 2018 WL 1924454, at *12-13; Williams, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213087, at *3-4; State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1,36-42 (Conn. 1998);
Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 357-58 (Fla. 1995).
See, e.g., Fisher, 690 A.2d at 918.
126.
See id; Powell, 652 So. 2d at 355-56; see also United States v. Parker, 872 F.3d 1, 12 (1 st
127.
Cir. 2017) (holding that group voir dire of the jury was permissible, and individual questioning of
each juror was not necessary).
See Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1157; Patton v. First Light Prop. Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-CV-1489128.
AJB-WVG, 2017 WL 5495104, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017), appealfiled,No. 17-56861 (9th
Cir. Dec. 13, 2017); Laguer, 44 N.E.3d at 872; Brown, 62 A.3d at 1105.
See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 59(a)(1)(A) (Upon motion, a court may grant a new trial on
129.
either all of the issues or only some of the issues to any party after a jury trial or nonjury trial for any
reason for "which a new trial [or rehearing] has ... been granted."); TEX. R. CIV. P. 320 ("New trials
may be granted and judgment set aside for good cause, on motion or on the court's own motion on
such terms as the court shall direct. New trials may be granted when the damages are manifestly too
small or too large.").
Fewer civil cases will likely find itnecessary to apply the Peha-Rodriguezstandard given
130.
its Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment focus on preserving the rights of criminal defendants. Civil
claims based on racial discrimination, however, may find Peha-Rodriguezinstructive as to whether
an exception to FED. R. EViD. 606(b) should be granted. In Patton v. FirstLight Prop. Mgmt., Inc.,
the Southern District of California applied Peha-Rodriguez to a civil housing discrimination claim
and therefore applied FED. R. CrV. P. 59(a) in determining whether to grant the defendants' motion
for a new trial. 2017 WL 5495104, at *2, *6-7. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a) provides that a "court may, on
motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues ...after a jury trial, for any reasons for which a
new trial has heretofore been granted." The Ninth Circuit, similar to other federal circuits, interprets
this standard to mean that "the trial court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the
clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage
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procedural rule requires the trial court to determine whether such movants have carried their burden in overcoming the no-impeachment rule
by considering "all [of] the circumstances" and facts at hand, including
witness credibility, the reliability of the evidence, and the "content and
timing" of the alleged statements.' 3' Given the evidentiary difficulty that
courts have experienced applying the Peha-Rodriguez racial-bias exception, it seems the wisest course for courts is to conduct complete evidentiary hearings in cases involving substantiated claims of juror racial bias. 132

2. The Appropriate Standard of Review
The Court in Peha-Rodriguez further left unresolved the appellate
standard of review that should apply in cases involving juror racial bias.
While the Court provided that the quantum of proof necessary to invoke
the exception may be133 satisfied by a trial court finding that racial bias
"pervaded the room"' or even by the presence of "[o]ne racist juror,"' 34
it declined to articulate the amount of deference that appellate courts
should provide trial court findings in this context.' 35 The vast majority of
appellate courts following Peha-Rodriguez, however, have applied the
highly deferential "abuse of discretion" standard in cases involving allegations of juror racial bias.' 36 Perhaps not surprisingly, no trial court deof justice." Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Passantino v.
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000)).
131.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); Williams v. Price, No.
2:98cvl320, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213087, at *21 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2017).
132.
See infra Section III.D.I. The Smith court, for instance, observed that "[i]n cases involving claims of improper racial bias by members of the jury, one procedure that courts have utilized is
to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the purported racially biased statements." United States v.
Smith, Crim. No. 12-183, 2018 WL 1924454, at *9 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2018); see, e.g., Williams,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213088, at *2-3 (noting that an evidentiary hearing was held); Commonwealth v. McCowen, 939 N.E.2d 735, 764 (Mass. 2010) (stating that the trial court should conduct
an evidentiary hearing when a defendant files an affidavit from a juror alleging that another juror's
comments reasonably demonstrated racial bias, and the credibility of the affidavit is in issue).
133.
Pehia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870-71 (quoting Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159
(7th Cir. 1987)).
134.
Id.(quoting United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001)).
135.
See id.
136.
See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 130-34 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying the abuse
of discretion standard to the trial judge's handling of allegations of juror misconduct); United States
v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 770 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion when
the trial court denied a motion for a new trial based on a jury foreperson's racist comments). A
number of cases invoking the Pehia-Rodriguez exception involve petitions on habeas seeking collateral review of a state criminal conviction. See, e.g., Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1158. The habeas process
of review is guided by statute, allowing a federal court to overturn a state conviction only upon a
finding, inter alia, of a "substantial likelihood of prejudice" or an "obvious default ofjus' ice" caused
by juror racial bias. See id. at 1159. 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus cannot
be granted by a federal court unless it is found that the state court adjudication: "(1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding." The Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor clarified that unreasonableness can be
satisfied by a finding that the state court decision was "simply 'erroneous' or wrong," thus amounting to a standard akin to de novo review. 529 U.S. 362, 388-89 (2000).
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exception have yet been overcisions involving the Pehia-Rodriguez
37
turned by an appellate court.1
Appellate review of trial court decisions on the racial-bias exception
should nonetheless be subjected to a less deferential standard of review,
given that such determinations often involve mixed questions of law and
fact. A mixed question of law and fact is present when the facts of an
issue are not in dispute, and yet the inferences to be made from those
Therefore, it may be apfacts are subject to differing interpretations.
propriate for an appellate court to review such mixed questions under the
less deferential de novo or substantial evidence standard if it becomes
apparent that the "primary facts are undisputed and ultimate inferences
and legal consequences are in dispute."' 39 Similarly, the content and existence of the allegedly racially biased statement(s) in cases invoking the
14
Peha-Rodriguez exception have rarely been in dispute. 0 Rather, the
central issue in Peha-Rodriguez cases is almost never whether the allegedly biased statements were in fact made by a juror, but the meaning and
4
interpretation that the trial court should give to those statements.1 Indeed, courts engaging in an analysis of juror statements alleged to be
racially biased are struggling less with whether those statements were
the inferences that flow
actually made by a juror and more with whether
142
from those statements indicate racial bias.
In United States v. Smith, 143 for example, the trial court was primarily concerned with determining whether race-neutral juror statements
44
One of the jucould nonetheless be inferred as reflecting racial bias.
"[is] a
the
defendant
(1)
that
stated
apparently
trial
rors in the defendant's
history[]"
criminal
a
previous
black man from North Minneapolis with
and (2) "[y]ou know, he's just a banger from the hood, so he's got to be
guilty.' 45 The court, armed with sworn affidavits from two jurors from
the trial, did not seriously question whether the statements were made but
But see Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 546 (2018) (finding in a per curiam decision that
137.
the trial and appellate courts erred in failing to find that evidence of juror racial bias created "a
strong factual basis for the argument that [the defendant's] race affected" the jury's vote for the
death penalty).
Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2009); Suzy's Zoo v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 875,
138.
878 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Suzy's Zoo, 273 F.3d at 878. Notably, there remains a difference of opinion as to
139.
whether mixed questions of law and fact should be subjected to strict de novo review or a similar
animal of review that requires a showing of substantial evidence. Compare, e.g., Mathews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that review of mixed questions of law and
fact is subject to the de novo standard), with Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that review of "determinations of mixed questions of law and fact" are to be done "for
substantial evidence").
See, e.g., Robinson, 872 F.3d at 770-71; Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1159; United States v.
140.
Smith, Crim. No. 12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *9-12 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2018).
See Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
141.
See Smith, 2018 WL 1924454, at *9-12.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. at *10.
144.
Id. at *4-5.
145.
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rather focused on the racialized meaning to give those statements.1 4 6 The
trial court ultimately held that while the statements do "not explicitly
invoke race," the "banger" statement nonetheless relied on a "racially
biased stereotype" which indicated that "racial animus was a significant
motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict.' ' 147 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit in Shillcutt v. Gagnon]48 did not seriously doubt that two of the
jurors actually made statements alleged by the defendant to reflect racial
bias. 149 The question for the court, rather, was whether a racist inference
could be reasonably reached from those statements: "let's be logical; he's
a black, and he sees a seventeen year old white girl-I know the type"
' 150
and in response, "[a] man like that isn't capable of loving anybody."
The court ultimately held that there was not a substantial likelihood that
the first statement had prejudiced the defendant, and interpreted the second statement in response as being "patently non-racial."'' The primary
concern for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Robinson,152 likewise,
was not whether the alleged statement had been made by a juror but how
to interpret the statement in light of the Peha-Rodriguez standard.1 53 The
court eventually held that the juror's statement of "[I] found it strange
that the colored women are the only two that can't see [that the AfricanAmerican defendants were guilty]," was a "mere offhand comment" rather than "clear statement[s]" of racial bias. 54 The determination of
whether a juror statement involved (1) racial animus such that it was
(2) a significant motivating factor in the juror's decision-making, is a
classic mixed question of law and fact, making a less deferential standard
1 55
of review appropriate.

146.

Id. at *7-13.

147.

Id. at *10.

148.

827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1987).

149.
150.

Id. at 1159-60.
Id. at 1159.

151.
Id.at 1159-60.
152.
872 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2017).
153.
Id. at 767 72.
154.
Id. at 770-71; see also Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Mass. 1991). In
Laguer the court did not genuinely question that a juror made the following statements during jury
deliberations: "the goddamned spic is guilty just sitting there; look at him. Why bother having the
trial"; "spics screw all day and night"; and other "bigoted invectives." Id. Rather, the court held that
the statements did not justify the granting of a new trial as they "did not relate specific factual information that might influence the fact-finding of reasonable jurors." Id. at 376. The court reasoned,
somehow, that the statements were "more indicative ... of the juror's ethnic bias, a matter of attitude, than of purported authoritative information unfavorable to the defendant." Id.
155.
See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 679 (Wash. 2011). While the majority held that only
evidence of flagrant prosecutorial racial bias was sufficient to overturn a verdict, id. at 679, the

concurrence argued that any evidence of prosecutorial racial bias was sufficient to vacate a criminal
conviction, id at 682-85 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). The prosecutorial racial bias in this case involved the prosecutor's pronunciation of police as "po-leese" to mimic black vernacular and repeated references to the code whereby "black folk don't testify against black folk" to the police. Id. at
679 (majority opinion). Notably, the concurrence's approach would provide no appellate discretion
to determinations of racial bias. If a finding of racial bias is made, then a reversal of the conviction is

required. Id. at 558-0 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
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3. Defining Racial Bias
State and federal courts have perhaps been struggling the most with
ascertaining whether a juror statement supports a reasonable inference of
racial bias following Peha-Rodriguez-particularlyif the statement is
seen as race neutral 56 or "non-racial";157 as ambiguous or "capable of
different interpretations"; 158 as not explicitly invoking a racial slur or
stereotype; 159 or as a mere "offhand comment" which nonetheless "indicat[es] racial bias or hostility."' 60 The majority opinion in Peha-Rodriguez provided little guidance to lower courts on bow to determine whether a juror statement constituted a "clear statement of racial
bias"-such as looking at whether the statement "relied on racial stereo62
On the facts in the Petypes"' 16 1 or constituted "overt racial bias."'
ha-Rodriguez case itself, the Court held that the statements by Juror H.C.
"were egregious and unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias" be163
Interestingly, the
cause they relied on "dangerous racial stereotype(s)."'
Court did not explicitly analyze how the juror's statements relied upon
specific "anti-Hispanic" racial stereotypes.' 64 The statements made by
Juror H.C.-which included remarks that "Mexican men are physically
controlling of women" and "I think he did it because he's Mexican and
Mexican men take whatever they want" and that "nine times out of ten
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young
girls" and that the defendant's alibi witness was not credible because he
was "an illegal"16-were perhaps viewed by the Court as so plainly invoking anti-Mexican racial stereotypes as to not warrant an analysis.
United States v. Smith, Crim. No. 12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *10-12 (D. Minn.
156.
Apr. 24, 2018).
Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding one of the juror
157.
comments to be "patently non-racial" in upholding the trial court decision to deny the defendant's
motion for a new trial on the grounds that the defendant was unable to demonstrate that there was "a
substantial likelihood that a racial slur, if it occurred, would have prejudiced" the defendant); see
also State v. Jackson, 81 Haw. 39, 45 (Haw. 1996) (denying a motion for a new trial based on a juror
statement regarding the defendant's use of alcohol ("[t]hat's the way they are") because the juror
making the statement denied that it had racial overtones).
State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110-11 (R.I. 2013) (finding that juror statements and
158.
actions did not constitute clear statements of racial bias since they were "ambiguous" and "capable
of different interpretations").
Patton v. First Light Prop. Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-CV-1489-AJB-WVG, 2017 WL 5495104,
159.
at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017) (holding that it was not established that the jurors "depended on a
racial stereotype" and that the "statements [were not racial bias, but reflected] preconceived notions
about ... Native Americans generally"), appealfiled,No. 17-56861 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2017).
United States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 770-71 (6th Cir. 2017) (interpreting a juror
160.
statement about "the colored women" on the jury a "mere 'offhand comment' rather than a "clear
statement" of bias (quoting Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017)).
Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
161.
Id.; see also Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 356 n.2 (Fla. 1995) (finding in a
162.
civil case that juror statements using racial slurs ("nigger") and relying on racial stereotypes (statement that defendants' children were "probably drug dealers") constituted overt acts of racial bias and
granting a new trial).
Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870.
163.
Id. at 861.
164.
Id. at 862.
165.
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While this was likely the case in Peha-Rodriguez,it is not at all clear that
the thousands of trial judges applying the newly identified racial-bias
exception have the requisite training or knowJedge to adequately
identify
166
when racial stereotypes are influencing juror behavior.
The few cases that have allowed post-verdict inquiry or granted new
trials based on juror racial bias, whether pre- or post-Pehia-Rodriguez,
have largely involved juror statements which invoked either explicit racial slurs (e.g., "niggers"' 167 or "spic' ' 168) or well-known racial stereotypes
(e.g., "[gang] banger from the hood"). 169 The Ninth Circuit in the prePehia-Rodriguez decision United States v. Henley,17 0 for example, wasted
little time determining that juror statements such as "[aill the niggers
should hang" and "[n]iggers are guilty" constituted racial bias.' 71 The
Ninth Circuit noted, given the statements reference to vulgar racial slurs,
that it "ha[s] considerable difficulty accepting the government's assumption that, at this time in our history, people who use the word 'nigger' are
not racially biased."'' 72 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Tharpe (its
only case to date applying Peha-Rodriguez, albeit in a brief per curiam
decision on a habeas petition) held that juror statements referencing racial slurs and relying on explicit racial stereotypes provided a "strong
factual basis" for deciding whether racial bias impacted the juror's guilty
vote. 173 The juror in this case apparently remarked during deliberations
that "there are two types of black people: 1. Black folks and 2. Niggers"
and that the defendant (who was African-American) "wasn't in the
'good' black folks category" and "should get the electric chair for what
17 4

he did."'

166.
See State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 841 (Iowa 2017) (explaining that all Iowa judges are
required to "undergo implicit-bias training and testing"); see also State v. Rashad, 484 S.W.3d 849,
860 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (Van Amburg, C.J., concurring) (indicating that the judicial education
curriculum in Missouri now includes implicit bias training); see also Carlos Berdej6, Criminalizing
Race: RacialDisparitiesin Plea-Bargaining,59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1242-43 (explaining that, as of
2016, all judges, prosecutors, and public defenders in Dane County, Wisconsin, receive implicit bias
training).
167.
United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Tharpe v.
Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 546 (2018). While Tharpe involved a habeas petition, the Court noted that

evidence of overt racist statements by a juror presented "a strong factual basis" for deciding whether
racial bias influenced the juror's guilty vote. Id.; see also Powell, 652 So. 2d at 356 n.2 (in which a
juror stated, "There's a saying in North Carolina, hit a nigger and get ten points, hit him when he's
moving, get fifteen.").
168.
Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Mass. 1991) (in which a juror remarked,
"[T]he goddamned spic is guilty just sitting there .... Why bother having the trial," among other
biased comments).
169.
United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Smith, Crim. No.
12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2018) (finding that the juror statement
reflects a racially biased stereotype).
170.
171.

238 F.3d 1111.
Id.at 1113-14.

172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1121.
Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 546 (2018).
Id.
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Cases involving juror statements which invoke "explicit" or obvious
racial stereotypes were also more likely to permit post-verdict inquiry or
175
The Peha-Rodriguez
grant a new trial because of juror racial bias.
v. Villar1 76 as an
States
in
United
decision
Circuit
Court cited the First
example of a federal circuit that had recognized a racial-bias exception to
177
The court in
the no-impeachment rule rooted in the Sixth Amendment.
Villar held that the Sixth Amendment required post-verdict judicial inquiry when "ethnically biased statements were made during jury deliberations." 178 The juror statement at issue involved a broad racialization
about the "Hispanic" defendant, where a "white" juror remarked during
' 79
deliberations that "I guess we're profiling but they all cause trouble.
to permit further
The First Circuit found that this was sufficient
1 80
bias.
racial
juror
of
examination
post-verdict
A recent case applying the Peha-Rodriguez racial-bias exception
from the District Court of Minnesota, Smith, provides a good example of
how the use of an explicit racial stereotype by a juror during delibera81
In Smith,
tions can serve as a basis for permitting post-verdict review.
the trial court was presented with evidence-based on juror affidavits
and testimony during a post-verdict evidentiary hearing-that a "white"
juror had made concerning statements about the "African-American"
defendant during deliberations, such as: "he's a black man from North
Minneapolis with a previous criminal history" and "you know, he's just a
82
The court noted that
banger from the hood, so he's got to be guilty."'
some of the juror statements did "not explicitly invoke race," but none83
The court utilized
theless relied upon "a racially biased stereotype."'
secondary sources such as a dictionary and demographic data reported by
the local newspaper to find that such statements were based on a racial
stereotype: that "a black man from a majority-black neighborhood of
Minneapolis-was a gang member, should be disbelieved, and was
guilty." 84 The court noted that the statements constituted racial bias under Pefia-Rodriguez because they "employed the racist stereotype that
black men from the inner city are gang members" and used "raciallyfrom the hood['] ... coupled with views on
charged language [']banger
' 85
[the defendant's] guilt."

See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 88-89 (lst Cir. 2009); see also United States v.
175.
Smith, Crim. No. 12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *10 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2018).
586 F.3d 76.
176.
See Pefla-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017).
177.
Villar, 586 F.3d at 87.
178.
Id. at 78, 79.
179.
See id. at 87 88.
180.
Crim. No. 12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *5, *15 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2018).
181.
Id. at *4-5.
182.

183.

Id. at *10.

184.

Id.

185.

Id.
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A handful of courts have also examined when supposedly "race
neutral," "non-racial," or "off-hand" juror statements amount to "racial
bias. ,1 86 The Supreme Court in Peha-Rodriguezprovided that "[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting
aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry,"' 18 7 and
made references to "overt"' 88 and "clear and explicit statements indicating ... racial animus"' 189 as examples of statements that would satisfy the
newfound test. Indeed, a few courts have relied heavily on the distinction
between "overt"' 90 or "clear"1' 91 statements of racial bias as opposed to
"non-racial, ' ' 192 "race-neutral,"' 93 or "ambiguous ' 94 juror statements
in
deciding whether post-verdict examination is appropriate. Utilizing this
distinction, a few courts have mechanically rejected claims of juror racial
bias when the alleged juror statements were either facially neutral or
subject to a nonracial interpretation.' 95 A recent federal court decision
applying the Peha-Rodriguez racial-bias exception, for example, was
faced with determining whether race-neutral statements made by several
jurors could establish racial bias under the test.' 96 In Patton v. FirstLight
Property Management, Inc.,' 97 the Southern District Court of California
analyzed whether race-neutral juror statements directed towards the "Native American" defendant amounted to racial bias. 98 The statements,
which included references that the defendant "would receive services
from the government," was a "registered tribal member," and "collects
casino money," were held by the court to not "rise[] to the level of 'racial
prejudice' to warrant admission" in a post-verdict context. 99 The trial
court reasoned that the Pehia-Rodriguez exception applied only to statements of "overt racial bias," and that the statements in the case at hand
did "not display a blatant racial bias ... similar to the racial stereotypes
in Pefia-Rodriguez.,20 0 The court was apparently not swayed by the fact
that the statements nonetheless relied upon base racial stereotypes about

186.
United States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 769-71 (6th Cir. 2017); Shillcutt v. Gagnon,
827 F.2d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 1987); Smith, 2018 WL 1924454, at *10; Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
652 So. 2d 355, 357-58 (Fla. 1995); State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110 (R.I. 2013).
187.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
188.
Id.
189.
Id. at 861.
190.
Powell, 652 So. 2d at 357-58.
191.
Robinson, 872 F.3d at 769-71.
192.
Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 1987).
193.
State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1112 (R.I. 2013).
194.
Id. at 1111.
195.
See Robinson, 872 F.3d at 769-71; Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1160; Williams v. Price, No.
2:98CV1320, 2017 WL 6729978, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2017); Patton v. First Light Prop.
Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-CV-1489-AJB-WVG, 2017 WL 5495104, at *1, *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017),
appealfiled,No. 17-56861 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2017).
196.
Patton, 2017 WL 5495104, at *6.
197.
Id.
198.
Id. at *6.

199.

Id. at *4, *6.

200.

Id. at *7.
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Native-Americans generally. 2 0 Similarly, another pre-Peha-Rodriguez
case rejected claims of juror racial bias on the grounds that the juror
statements were "non-rac[ial]" or ambiguous with respect to racial bi20220
In State v. Brown,2 °3 the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected a
as.
post-verdict motion for a new trial based on allegations of juror racial
bias. 2 04 Following the Native-American defendants' conviction, a juror
contacted the trial court out of concern that at least two other jurors had
been racially biased against the defendants. 205 The juror eventually attested that one of the jurors had referred to the Native-American defendants as "those people" during deliberations, and that once a verdict was
reached another juror had "banged two water bottles together like he was
playing a tom-tom drum. 2 °6 While the court held that it was permissible
for the trial court to consider post-verdict evidence of juror racial bias
(notwithstanding the no-impeachment rule), it nonetheless held that the
statements and actions were "ambiguous, innocuous, and capable of different interpretations. 20 7 As such, the court found that "none of these...
statements or acts is overtly racist" and that they "did not necessarily
have a racist undertone., 208 The court therefore affirmed that no new trial
was necessary as "none of the jurors had made clear statements evidencing racial bias"-notwithstanding that the jurors clearly had relied on
209
racial stereotypes in making their statements.
The mechanical distinction between "race neutral" and "overt"
statements is a poor and misleading judicial shortcut, however, for ascertaining whether a juror statement amounts to racial bias pursuant to Peha-Rodriguez. Modem manifestations of racism are now typically covert
rather than explicit, and facially neutral rather
rather than overt, implicit
2 10
than plainly explicit.

See Brian Bull, For Native Americans, Old Stereotypes Die Hard, NPR (May 4, 2009,
201.
12:56 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=103711756 ("Native Americans
have a long history of one-sided portrayals inHollywood, including such stereotypical characters as
the war-whooping savage or the grunting tribesman."); see also Lucy A. Ganje, Marketing the Sacred: Commodifying Native-American Cultural Images, in IMAGES THAT INJURE: PICTORIAL
STEREOTYPES INTHE MEDIA 91-93 (Susan Dente Ross & Paul Martin Lester eds., 3d ed.2011).
State v.Brown,62 A.3d 1099, 1111 (R.I. 2013).
202.
Id.
203.
204.
Id.at 1111, 1113.

205.

Id.at1105.

206. Id. at1106. Notably, these allegations were verified by two otherjurors. Id.
207. Id.at1111.
208. Id.at 1110.
209. Id.at1106-07.
210. See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 335 (Wash.2013) ("In part, the problem isthat
Yet we allliveour
has changed. It isnow socially unacceptable to be overtly racist.
racism itself
liveswith stereotypes that are ingrained and often unconscious, implicit biases that endure despite
to eliminate them.Racism now lives not inthe open but beneath the surface-in our
our best efforts
and our subconscious thought processes-because we suppress itand because we create
institutions
it anew through cognitive processes that have nothing to do with racialanimus."), abrogated by
Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 (Wash.2017); see also infra Part II for a more detailed discussion of modem racism and itsmany iterations.
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4. The Impact of Racial Bias on Juror Decision-Making
In addition to demonstrating that a juror statement was racially biased, Peha-Rodriguez requires a showing that such "racial animus was a
significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict" before making an exception to the no-impeachment rule. 21 1 The Peha-Rodriguez
Court, again, did not provide clear guidance for trial courts to follow in
terms of determining the impact of racial bias on juror decision-making.2 12 Nonetheless, the Court did find that the statements by the
Peha-Rodriguezjuror were "egregious and unmistakable in their reliance
on racial bias" in that they demonstrated that the juror "deploy[ed] a
dangerous racial stereotype to conclude [the defendant] was guilty...
213
[and] encouraged other jurors to join him in convicting on that basis.,
There have only been a handful of decisions applying this prong of
the Peha-Rodriguez racial-bias test. 214 In the already discussed case of
Smith, the district court found that juror statements indicating that the
African-American defendant was a "banger from the hood" was sufficient evidence that "racial animus was a significant motivating factor in
the juror's vote to convict. 2 1 5 The district court reached this conclusion
because juror's statement "directly ties a race-based stereotype to...
[the] conclusion of guilt" and was made while jury deliberations were
ongoing.21 6 The Smith approach to divining the impact of a racially biased statement on juror decision-making fulfills the spirit of Pe-

211.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
212.
Id. at 869-70 ("This case does not ask, and the Court need not address, what procedures a
trial court must follow when confronted with a motion for a new trial based on juror testimony of
racial bias.").
213.
Id. at 870.
214.
Most of the decisions applying Pehia-Rodriguezhave found that the complained-of juror
statements did not amount to racial bias and thus did not engage in an analysis of whether those
statements "significantly motivated" the juror's decision to convict. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 771 (6th Cir. 2017); Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir.
2013); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1987); Patton v. First Light Prop.
Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-CV-1489-AJB-WVG, 2017 WL 5495104, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017),
appealfiled,No. 17-56861 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2017); State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110-11 (R.I.
2013). There have also been pre-Pehia-Rodriguezcases that touched upon this issue. See, e.g., Fisher
v. State, 690 A.2d 917, 920 (Del. 1996) (finding that a juror's racially biased comment played a role
in her decision-making since "[s]he injected into the deliberations her own prejudice that any African-American who would be in the area is guilty"); Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371,
375 76 (Mass. 1991) (finding, incredibly, that juror statements using the racial slurs "the goddamned spic is guilty" during deliberations "did not relate specific factual information that might
influence the fact-finding ofreasonable jurors").
215.
United States v. Smith, Crim. No. 12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *10 (D. Minn.
Apr. 24, 2018). But ee Williams v. Price, No. 2:98cv1320, 2017 WL 6729978, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
29, 2017). In Williams, the Western District of Pennsylvania was asked to rule on the AfricanAmerican's motion for a new trial pursuant to Peha-Rodriguez on the basis of evidence that one of
the jurors had called a defense witness "a nigger lover." Id. at *7. While the court acknowledged that
the statement amounted to a "racial slur," it nonetheless held that statement did "not show that racial
animus was a significant motivating factor in the vote to convict." Id. at *9. Central to the court's
analysis was the fact that the slur was directed toward the defendant's witness during deliberations,
rather than toward the defendant. Id.
216.
Smith, 2018 WL 1924454, at *10.
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ia-Rodriguez in recognizing that racially biased statements made as part

of jury deliberations on guilt necessarily significantly motivated that
juror's decision-making.
III. THE SCIENCE OF JUROR RACIAL BIAS

Trial courts have been struggling to apply the racial-bias exception
to the no-impeachment rule set forth in Peha-Rodriguez in a uniform and
consistent manner, increasing the possibility that juror racial bias will
continue to seep into the jury room.2 17 The difficulty with applying Peha-Rodriguez lies principally in the problems that trial judges experience
in attempting to identify whether juror statements are "racist"-much
less whether such statements influenced juror decision-making-given
the lack of a clear definition for "racism." This Part of the Article surveys the sociological and psychological literature on racism and its impact on group decision-making in an attempt to identify useful guidelines
to assist courts in the Peiia-Rodriguezanalysis.
A. Defining Racism in a Post-Racism World
Any definition of "racism" necessarily must first take account of the
shifting nature of "race." The concept of race has no scientific or biological meaning, developing over time as a social and political method to
t
The definilegitimize the unequal legal treatment of groups of people.
in questhe
society
on
depending
ways
subtle
in
shifts
thus
of
race
tion
inequalirationalize
to
society
of
that
tion and on the sociopolitical needs
2
ty on the grounds of supposed racial difference. 19 The malleability of the
race concept is perhaps best illustrated by the vast array of often220
conflicting racial categories that have developed around the world. The
determination of an individual's race is thus impacted by a confluence of

217.

See, e.g., id. at *13.

218.

See generally MICHAEL OMI

&

HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED

STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994) (perhaps the seminal historical analysis of the
social construction of "race"). Notwithstanding the advent of DNA ancestry testing or racialized
genetic databases, which has resurrected notions of biological race, the artifice of "race" remains at
its core devoid of genetic meaning. For a more detailed examination of race theory and its relationship to modem biotechnology and population genetics, please see Sundquist, supra note 6; see also
DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE
RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7-8 (2011).

The sociologist Howard Winant puts it thusly: "Although the concept of race appeals to
219.
biologically based human characteristics (phenotypes), selection of these particular human features
for purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process. There is
no biological basis for distinguishing human groups along the lines of race, and the sociohistorical
categories employed to differentiate among these groups reveal themselves, upon serious examination, to be imprecise if not completely arbitrary." Howard Winant, Race and Race Theory, 26 ANN.
REV. SOC. 169, 172 (2000).
See Lorena Madrigal & Guido Barbujani, Partitioningof Genetic Variation in Human
220.
Populations and the Concept of Race, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL GENETICS: THEORY, METHODS AND
APPLICATIONS 19, 27 (Michael Crawford ed. 2007) ("If races are biological realities, they must be
the same everywhere, whereas forensic race catalogues differ across countries.").
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factors, which may include prevailing social norms, self-identification,
22
outsider identification, phenotype, dress, accent, and behavior. '
If race is scientifically meaningless from a biological perspective,
then racism similarly cannot be identified from discrete biomarkers or
technological testing. 2 2 This partly explains why no clear definition of
racism, capable of mechanically identifying statements or behaviors as
"racist," exists. Despite the absence of a scientific test of racism, empirical research from the sociological and psychological fields may be helpful to trial judges in better understanding the nature of racism as well as
how racial bias can impact juror decision-making.
B. The Sociology of Racism
Any definition of racism should therefore take into account that it is
a distinctly structural phenomenon embedded in the legal, social, and
cultural systems of a society. 223 While such systemic racism may well
manifest in individual and group expressions of racial bias, it is defined
at its core as a set of social, economic, psychological, and legal systems
that promote white superiority and nonwhite inferiority.22 4 There have
been a number of sociological attempts to understand and delimit the
nature of racism, but perhaps the most concise summary of a sociological
theory of racism is as follows:
[Racism is defined by:] (1) Signifying practice that essentializes or
naturalizes human identities based on racial categories or concepts;
(2) Social action that produces unjust allocation of socially valued resources, based on such significations; (3) Social structure that repro225
duces such allocations.
While structural theories of racism share a common focus on locating the heart of racism in systemic practices that promote or preserve
white privilege,226 there are some differences amongst the principal sociological models. The racial formation model, advanced by Michael Omi
and Howard Winant, stresses the "sociohistorical process by which racial
categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" in understanding racism. 227 This perspective was informed by an older sociological perspective that conceived of racism as "a combination of prejudice
221.
See, e.g., Christian B. Sundquist, Science Fictions and Racial Fables: Navigating the
FinalFrontierof Genetic Interpretation,25 HARV. BLACKLETFER L.J. 57, 90 (2009).
222.
See JONATHAN KAHN, RACE ON THE BRAIN: WHAT IMPLICIT BIAS GETS WRONG ABOUT

THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 207 (2018) (observing that no technical or scientific methods
exist to test
"racism," given that race itself is socially constructed).
223.
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence IlI, The Id, the Ego, and EqualProtection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).
224.
See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 9 (3d ed. 2010).
225.
HOWARD WNANT, THE NEW POLITICS OF RACE: GLOBALISM, DIFFERENCE, JUSTICE 220

n.6 (2004).
226.
See Sundquist, supra note 6, at 373-74.
227.

OMI & WtNANT, supra note 218, at 55.
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and power that allows the dominant race to institutionalize its dominance
at all levels in a society. '228 The sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva concludes that racism cannot be understood narrowly as individual racial
bias, but rather as an "ideological structure of a social system that crystallizes racial notions and stereotypes" by rationalizing the "social, polit229
At other times
ical and economic interactions between the races.,
Bonilla-Silva has restated his perspective of racism as reflecting "racially
biased frameworks used by actors to explain and justify (dominant race)
23 °
or challenge (subordinate race or races) the racial status quo.
The focus on "stereotypes" and "frameworks" by Bonilla-Silva and
other sociologists is perhaps most relevant to a better understanding of
how to identify racially biased juror statements under Peha-Rodriguez.
From a sociological perspective, stereotypes can be understood as overgeneralizations about a group of persons that exist to perpetuate racial
ideology.23 ' Structural racism can manifest itself in society in a variety of
ways, from "Jim Crow" racism based on explicit racial stereotypes and
slurs linked to claims of nonwhite biological inferiority to modem forms
of "colorblind" and "post-racial" racism based on race-neutral statements
232
The latter
sounding in economic liberalism and cultural deficiency.
given
identify
to
judges
for
difficult
especially
be
can
racism
of
forms
to
nonetheless
language
coded
or
race-neutral
that they often utilized
233
23
As I have summarized
convey a view of nonwhite racial inferiority.
previously, such race-neutral ideologies tend to rationalize the persistence of the racial status quo (and thus inequality) by advancing:
(1) cultural explanations for inequality, (2) the rhetoric of liberal
concepts of the free market, individualism and equal opportunity,
(3) the tools of234colorblind constitutionalism, and (4) the politics of
post-racialism.
Colorblind and post-racial ideologies are thus racist under a structural understanding of racism because they operate to preserve the existing racial hierarchy. 235 Bonilla-Silva posits that a colorblind (and by exEduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation,62 AM.
228.
Soc. REV. 465, 466 (1997).

229.

Id. at 474.

BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 224.
230.
See James L. Hilton & William von Hippel, Stereotypes, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 237,
231.
243 (1996).
BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 224, at 2.
232.

Id. at 3.
233.
Sundquist, supra note 6, at 370. Post-racialism has been described as the "liberal embrace
234.
of colorblindness." Ian F. Haney Lopez, Is the "Post" in Post-Racialthe "Blind" in Colorblind?, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 808 (2011). Professor Sumi Cho defines post-racialism as "a twenty-firstcentury ideology that reflects a belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made,
the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies, and that civil
society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of social action." Sumi Cho, PostRacialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009).
BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 224, at 3.
235.
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tension, post-racial) racial ideology consists of four pathways for "interpreting information": abstract liberalism, cultural racism, naturalization,
and the minimization of racism. 236 He argues that the framing of racial
issues in terms of liberalism-with its focus on individualism, equal opportunity, universalism, and classic market economics-allows people to
ignore the reality of structural inequality in favor of seemingly
race-neutral explanations that nonetheless rely on race-based stereotypes.237 Naturalization is defined as a frame that allows people to rationalize racial disparities as "natural occurrences. 23 8 Similarly, "cultural
racism" within the colorblind, post-racial ideology is present when people rely on "culturally based arguments" to rationalize racial inequality. 239 And finally, minimization occurs when one claims that racial discrimination is aberrational and cannot explain the persistence of
race-based disparities. 240 Notably, the sociological frames of colorblind
racial ideology resemble the psychological findings on "symbolic racism" and "implicit bias" in that both fields recognize that racism can be
perpetuated through seemingly nonracial statements and actions.241
A new racial phenomenon is arguably occurring following the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, which I tend to refer to as either
"post-racism" or "racial relativism." I conceive of post-racism as
the
modem social trend to rationalize even overt and explicitly racist statements and ideas as reflecting facts. 242 Racism is increasingly being seen
in society as "relative," with white nationalists and members of the
alt-Right defining their views on white racial superiority as "not racist"
because they reflect supposed biological realities, cultural realities, or
both. 243 This attempt to redefine racism is, of course, an attempt to reduce racism to a meaningless concept while normalizing racial inequality.
The structural conception of racism is often contrasted with individualist or idealist models or prejudice, which tend to define racism narrowly as "a set of ideas or beliefs" held by individuals which can develop
236.
Id. at 74.
237.
Id. at 76. Bonilla-Silva uses the example of opposition to affirmative-action policies on
the grounds that they violate liberal norms of "equal opportunity." Id.
238.
Id. Bonilla-Silva provides the following as an example of naturalization: white people
defending racial segregation on the grounds that it is natural for people to prefer to live with others
of the same race. Id.
239.
Id. Bonilla-Silva uses as examples the following statements (which rely on stereotypes):
"Mexicans do not put much emphasis on education" and "blacks have too many babies." Id.
240.
Id.at 77.
241.
See infra Section III.C of this Article for an analysis of the social psychological research

in these areas.
242.
See BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 224, at 96.
243.
See, e.g., id. at 77; Gavin Evans, The Unwelcome Revival of "Race Science," GUARDIAN
(Mar. 2, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/02/the-unwelcome-revivalof-race-science; Andrew Sullivan, Denying Genetics Isn 'tShutting Down Racism, It's Fueling It,
N.Y. MAG.: INTELL]GiNCER (Mar. 30, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/denyinggenetics-isnt-shutting-down-racism-its-fueling-it.html.
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into "negative attitudes towards an entire group of people"
(e.g., prejudice).244 Such interpretations of racism have principally been
made in the field of social psychology, creating tension with structuralist
245
theories rooted in sociological research. A common sociological objection to psychological theories of racism (i.e., prejudice) is that they tend
to reduce racism to a "psychological phenomenon to be examined at the
individual level., 246 The criticism of the individualistic focus of psychological theory on racism is well-deserved, given its tendency to promote
an understanding of racism as an aberrational phenomenon existing solely in individual cognitive biases rather than in the legal and political sys247
However, there may yet be some value to the
tems of social control.
psychological examination of racial bias. Modem psychological interpretations of racism do not necessarily need to conflict with sociological
theory. Whereas structuralist definitions of racism provide a categorical
understanding of how racism operates in society, psychological theory
can help us understand how systemic racism is thereafter expressed in
society. Indeed, many social psychologists agree that racism is systemic
in nature, but that it also "involves mental structures and psychodynamic
processes that operate in both the perpetrator of such social actions and
the victim. ' 248 An understanding of both the sociological and psychological roots of racism can thus better aid judicial application of the PehaRodriguez racial-bias exception.
C. The Psychology of Racism
The field of social psychology has long examined the manner in
which racial prejudice can develop in individuals, how that cognitive
bias may thereafter be expressed, and when bias can impact decision-making. 249 While psychology perhaps lacks the tools to describe the
systemic nature of racism, it has striven to empirically examine the impact that such systemic racism can have on individual and group thought
250
The socialprocesses--especially through the reliance on stereotypes.
cognition model in psychology views stereotypes as "mental representations of ...differences between groups ... allowing easier and more
efficient processing of information., 251 Such "cognitive schemas" or
generalizations are utilized by individuals on a regular basis as mental

Bonilla-Silva, supra note 228 (citing scholarly works in the social psychology field).
244.
See id.(critiquing empirical findings in social psychology for being narrowly focused on
245.
individual bias).
Id. at 467.
246.
See id. at 466-67.
247.
Brian Rasmussen & Daniel Salhani, A Contemporary Kleinian Contribution to Under248.
standing Racism, 84 SOC. SERV. REv. 491, 493 (2010).
See generally THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND
249.
DISCRIMINATION (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter THE SAGE HANDBOOK].
See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Ann Marie Russell, Cognitive Processes, in The SAGE Hand250.
book, supra note 249, at 115, 115-17.
Hilton & von Hippel, supra note 231, at 240- 1.
251.
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heuristics.
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This approach is oversimplistic, and a bit misleading, when

applied to the racial context in that it defines stereotypes solely at an
individual level without taking into account the broader social forces that
incentivize the use of stereotypes to preserve racial hierarchy.253 A more
basic definition of stereotypes appearing in the literature is a bit more
useful: "[a] social stereotype is a mental association between a social
group or category and a trait.''254 That said, modem psychological empirical findings are nonetheless useful to understanding juror racial bias
under the individualized Peha-Rodriguez framework.2 55
Psychological research recognizes five principal models of racial
prejudice: dominative racism, laissez-faireracism, aversive racism, symbolic racism, and unconscious racism (or "implicit bias").2 56 Dominative
racism refers to "old-fashioned" or traditional forms of racial bias,
whereby a dominative racist is the "type who acts out bigoted beliefs...
[H]e represents the open flame of racial hatred. 2 57 Sociologists, in turn,
similarly refer to dominative racism as "Jim Crow" or "old-fashioned"
forms of direct and explicit racial bias typically rooted in "beliefs
about... mental, moral and intellectual inferiority" based on claimed
biological difference. 258 Racial statements made by the classic bigot,
white nationalist, or Ku Klux Klan member would undoubtedly fit within
this model.
Racism, as Justice Blackmun observed some time ago, is "not less
real or pernicious" even though it now may "take[] a form more subtle
252.
E.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes on Decision
Making and Information-ProcessingStrategies, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 267, 267
(1985).
253.
See Bonilla-Silva, supra note 228, at 467.
254.
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 949 (2006).
255.
Peha-Rodriguez asks courts to determine whether an individual juror statement amounts
to "racial bias," taking into account the timing and content of the statement and whether other racially biased statements were made by jurors. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
If an individual juror is found to have made a racially biased statement, the court must then determine whether it is reasonable to infer that the juror's decision to convict was influenced by racial
bias. Id. Even the sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, who is often critical of the individualized
nature of psychological research on racism, acknowledges that social psychology can help society
better understand how racist attitudes are expressed. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 224, at 7 (noting
that "despite its limitations, the symbolic racism tradition [in psychology] has brought attention to
key elements of how whites explain racial inequality today").
256.
Lawrence Bobo & James R. Kluegel, Status, Ideology, and Dimensions of Whites' Racial
Beliefs andAttitudes: Progressand Stagnation, in RACIAL ATFITUDES IN THE 1990s, at 93, 95 (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds., 1997); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 6 (2004); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note
254, at 946. Another model of racism that will not be discussed at length in this article is Modem
Racism Theory. Modem Racism Theory focuses on the connection between conservative political
beliefs and racially discriminatory behaviors. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra, at 6-7. Later in this
Article, however, various psychometric tools that have developed to measure racism, including the
"Modem Racism Scale," will be discussed. See infra notes 276-97 and accompanying text.
257.
JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 54 (1970); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra
note 256, at 3.
258.
See BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 224, at 25; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 256, at 3.
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than before., 25 9 The other main psychological models thus focus on more
indirect forms of racial bias to describe "modem racism., 260 The justification-suppression model explains why many people tend to express
racial bias in nuanced and facially neutral ways as opposed to explicit
demonstrations of racism. 26 1 According to this model, "genuine prejudices" are often not explicitly expressed as they are "restrained by beliefs,
262
values and norms that suppress" such expression in modem society.
Rather, racial prejudices are often only "expressed when justifications
(e.g., attributions, ideologies, stereotypes) release suppressed prejudices. ,,263
The concept of laissez-faire racism, by its terms, rationalizes racial
inequality as reflecting natural economic forces in a free-market system. 264 As such, laissez-faire racism "encompasses an ideology that
blames blacks themselves for their poorer relative economic standing,
seeing it as a function of perceived cultural inferiority." 265 This conceptualization of racism connects well with the sociological model of "cultural racism" discussed earlier,266 in that it rationalizes racial inequality
of "deficient personal choices" or supposed cultural deon the grounds
7
pravity.

26

The aversive model of racism, related in many ways to conceptions
of "symbolic" and "implicit" racism, was one of the earliest alternative
26 8
understandings of "indirect and subtle" forms of racial bias. Aversive
racism is described as reflecting "the conflict between whites' denial of
personal prejudice and underlying unconscious negative feelings toward
and beliefs about [nonwhite persons]., 269 The aversive-racism model
thus presumes that some white individuals may support racial equality in
theory, yet nonetheless be influenced by "unconscious" psychological
processes to express racial bias. 27 0 As such, the model holds that since
''aversive racists consciously recognize and endorse egalitarian values
and because they truly aspire to be non-prejudiced, they will not discriminate in situations with strong social norms when discrimination would

Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1979).
259.
Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 256.
260.
Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification-SuppressionModel of the Expres261.
sion and Experienceof Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414, 414 (2003).
Id.
262.
Id.
263.
See Ross L. Matsueda & Kevin Drakulich, Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, Symbolic
264.
Racism, and Racial Politics, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 163, 166-67 (2009).
Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 256.
265.
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
266.
Christian Sundquist, Equal Opportunity, Individual Liberty, and Meritocracy in Educa267.
tion: Reinforcing Structures of Privilege and Inequality, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 227, 236
(2002).
See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 256, at 3, 6.
268.
Id. at 4.
269.
Id.at 4-5.
270.
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be obvious
to others and to themselves" to "avoid the attribution of racist
27
intent. , 1
Symbolic racism is arguably slightly different from aversive racism
in that it incorporates political beliefs based in liberalism to explain the
expression of racial bias.272 A summary definition of symbolic racism
likely would include the following claims:
(1) Racial discrimination is no longer a serious obstacle to blacks'
prospects for a good life, so that (2) blacks' continuing disadvantages
are largely due to their unwillingness to work hard enough ...[and]

[a]s a result, both their (3)273continuing demands and (4) increased ad-

vantages are unwarranted.

Symbolic racist attitudes thus tend to focus on beliefs that nonwhite
persons are lazy, have a poor work ethic, and receive unearned benefits
in violation of traditional American values. 274 Symbolic racism is thus
"preoccupied with matters of moral character, informed by the virtues
associated with the traditions of individualism ...[and at] its center are
the contentions that blacks do not try hard enough to overcome275the diffi'
culties they face and that they take what they have not earned."
Growing out of psychological research on the expression of indirect
or nontraditional forms of racism, such as aversive and symbolic racism,
the implicit-bias theory purports to be able to measure unconscious ingroup and outgroup "discriminatory bias[] based on implicit attitudes or
implicit stereotypes. 276 The model posits that unconscious bias can be
tested in individuals through a variety of tests--one of the more prominent being the Implicit Association Test (TAT). 277 Implicit-bias testing
has revealed the presence of widespread racial prejudice in America,
notwithstanding the decrease in expressions of overt (or dominative)
racial bias. 278 The IAT operates by "measuring the strength of the association between social categories (e.g., Blacks or Whites) and positive and
279
negative attributes (e.g., 'joy' and 'love' versus 'agony' and 'evil').,
The racial version of the IAT (black-white) requires subjects to quickly
271.

Id. at7.

272.
Id. at 6 ("Symbolic Racism Theory emphasizes that beliefs about individualism and meritocracy that become racialized motivate opposition to policies designed to benefit racial and ethnic
minorities.").
273.
Christopher Tarman & David 0. Sears, The Conceptualizationand Measurement of Symbolic Racism, 67 J. POL. 731, 733 (2005).
274.
See id.
275.
DAVID. R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 105-06 (1996).
276.
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 254, at 951.
277.
Id.at954.
278.
See, e.g., John F. Dovidio, Racial Bias, Unspoken but Heard, 326 SCIENCE 1641, 1641
(2009); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971
(2006).
279.
R. Richard Banks et al., Discriminationand Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1182 (2006).
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make associations of images or words that appear on a computer screen
with positive or negative evaluative descriptors. 28 0 The theory is that
having participants make such fast associations between race and value
281
Indeed, studies
judgments can reveal hidden and unconscious bias.
have found that perhaps 90% to 95% of white Americans are racially
valuable empirical evidence that our socibiased in some way, providing
282
ety is far from "post-racial.,

The implicit-bias model has received significant popular attention,
28
and controversy, during the last few decades. 83 Scores of law review
articles have been written on how law can respond to ameliorate implicit
bias; 284 extensive empirical research has been conducted on unconscious
bias; 2 85 and implicit-bias testing and education has become a profitable
cornerstone of diversity and inclusion training for universities, police
departments, and workplaces. 286 However, the soundness of implicit-bias
findings have recently been called into question by both new empirical
findings and critical analyses. A recent meta-analysis of implicit bias
research has found that implicit-bias testing was not correlated with external or explicit measures of behavior. 287 As such, the researchers determined that "current interventions that attempt to change implicit
288
measures will not consistently change behavior in these domains,,
undermining the value of implicit-bias training in predicting actual behavior. In short, the study indicates that "the correlation between implicit
bias and discriminatory behavior appear weaker than previously thought"
and that "there is very little evidence that changes in implicit bias have

IMPLICIT,
PROJECT
IAT,
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About
e.g.,
See,
280.
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html.
Anthony G. Greenwald & Shelly D. Farnham, Using the Implicit Association Test to
281.
Measure Self-Esteem and Self-Concept, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1022, 1023 (2000).
Jeff Nesbit, America, Racial Bias Does Exist, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: AT THE EDGE
282.
(Jan 13, 2015, 11:36 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2015/01/13/americaracial-bias-does-exist.
CHERYL STAATS ET AL., KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY, OHIO
283.
STATE UNIV., STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 8-9 (2017); Kathleen Nalty, Strategies for Confronting UnconsciousBias, COLO. LAW., May 2016, at 45, 45.
See, e.g., Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 254, at 962-63; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note
284.
278 at 976-80; Lawrence, supra note 223, at 326; Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality:
Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,and Misremembering,57 DUKE L.J. 345, 350-51 (2007). A Westlaw
search taking place on October 13, 2018 found that the term "implicit bias" appeared 2,743 times in
its "law reviews and journals" database.
See, e.g., STAATS ET AL., supra note 283.
285.
Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Demandfor Diversity and Inclusion Experts Is on the Rise, HR
286.
DIVE (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.hrdive.com/news/demand-for-diversity-and-inclusion-experts-ison-the-rise/520131; see also Karsten Strauss, More Evidence that Company Diversity Leads to
PM),
3:59
2018,
25,
(Jan.
FORBES
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https://www.forbes.con/sites/karstenstrauss/2018/01/25/more-evidence-that-company-diversityleads-to-better-profits; Valentina Zarya, I Failedthis Test on Racism and Sexism and So Will You,
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Patrick S. Forscher et al., A Meta-Analysis of Procedures to Change Implicit Measures 45
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(Aug. 13, 2018) (unpublished manuscript).
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anything to do with changes in a person's behavior., 289 Even the founders of the implicit-bias field have acknowledged the test's difficulty with
reliability and replicability of results. 290 Other studies have suggested that
implicit-bias testing does not actually measure unconscious racism, finding that participants are "consciously aware" of their "implicit" prejudices when taking the test. 29' While these findings call into question the
utility of pretrial strategies to reduce implicit juror racial bias, the use of
jury instructions and other predeliberation strategies to blunt racial bias
should continue to be explored.
The assumptions underlying implicit-bias research have also been
recently critiqued for obscuring the nature of systemic racism by allowing people to shed moral and legal responsibility for their own racism
due to its "hidden" and "unconscious" basis.292 Indeed, if racial prejudice
is seen as largely subconscious and uncontrollable, then it follows that
individuals may feel as though they lack a moral and legal responsibility
to eradicate racial inequality. Michael Selmi similarly argues that conceiving of racism as implicit bias has made it more difficult for the law to
respond to racial discrimination: "[d]efining contemporary discrimination as unconscious and beyond one's control is not just inaccurate descriptively, but it makes such bias more difficult to prove." 293 Professor
Tryon P. Woods further argues that implicit bias "presents us with a superficial understanding of racism ... [in that it presumes] that racism should have gone away with the eradication of explicit discrimination, that the civil rights gains would not have stalled, become eviscerated, or undergone a reversal, but for this nagging little problem of peo294
ple's cognitive processes.,

289.
Tom Bartlett, Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias? Maybe Not, CHRON. REV. (Jan. 5,
2017) ("[T]he link between unconscious bias, as measured by the test, and biased behavior has long
been debated among scholars.").
290.
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit Association Test
Can Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 553, 559-60 (2015).
291.
Adam Hahn & Betram Gawronski, Do Implicit Evaluations Reflect Unconscious Attitudes?, 37 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 28, 29 (2014); see also Lawrence T. White, Is Implicit Bias a
Useful
Scientific
Concept?,
PSYCHOL.
TODAY
(June
23,
2017),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/culture-conscious/201706/is-implicit-bias-usefulscientific-concept (arguing that IAT testing has "limited ability to predict actual behavior").
292.
Olivia Goldhill, The World Is Relying on a Flawed Psychological Test to Fight Racism,
QUARTZ (Dec. 3, 2017), https://qz.com/ l144504/the-world-is-relying-on-a-flawed-psychologicaltest-to-fight-racism ("The implicit bias narrative also lets us off the hook. We can't feel as guilty or
be held to account for racism that isn't conscious. The forgiving notion of unconscious prejudice has
become the go-to explanation for all manner of discrimination, but the shaky science behind the IAT
suggests this theory isn't simply easy, but false. And if implicit bias is a weak scapegoat, we must
confront the troubling reality that society is still, disturbingly, all too consciously racist and sexist.").
293.
Michael Selmi, The Paradoxof Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 193, 197 (2018).
294.
Tryon P. Woods, The Implicit Bias of Implicit Bias Theory, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 631, 640
(2018). Professor Woods further posits that "[i]mplicit bias theory's underlying assumptions, distinct
from its cognitive science conclusions, reveal the ongoing hegemony of liberalism, generally, and of
colorblindness ideology, specifically." Id. at 634.
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The empirical and theoretical difficulties with implicit biasresearch, unfortunately, complicate the attempt to identify guidelines on
implicit bias that could aid judicial application of the Pefia-Rodriguez
exception. Notably, psychological research has developed a number of
empirical methods to measure racial prejudice: the Modern Racism
Scale, the Old Fashioned Racism Scale, the Blatant Prejudice Scale, the
Subtle Prejudice Scale, and, of course, the IAT.2 95 While each of these
measures have been empirically demonstrated to some degree in the past,
they largely rely on survey instruments based on participant selfreporting to identify prejudice.296 These measures, nonetheless, could be
used as examples of statements empirically found to be associated with
racial bias in determining whether a juror statement constitutes racial
bias.297
The existence of racial bias on the jury has long been found to be
clearly associated with distorted trial outcomes. 298 A meta-analysis of
juror racial bias found that "[r]esearch on race and legal decision making
has provided compelling evidence that race can exert a causal effect on
trial outcomes in some cases. ' 299 In particular, the study noted that research had shown that white mock jurors were "harsher in their judgments of out-group vs. in-group defendants" as well as in their "sentencing recommendations for Black vs. White defendants." 300 The study analyzed widespread research findings that the racial composition of a jury
can influence its decision-making, concluding that the explicit and im301
plicit biases of jurors most likely caused such distorted trial outcomes.
Additional empirical studies have similarly found that juror racial
bias can impact decision-making with regard to guilt and the interpretation of ambiguous evidence.30 2 One such study found that people "im-

THE SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 249, at 50, 318, 322-23 (describing the implicit
295.
association test and modem and old-fashioned racism); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 256 at 6-7
(describing modern and old-fashioned racism); T.F. Pettigrew & R.W. Meertens, Subtle and Blatant
Prejudice in Western Europe, 25 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 57, 57-58 (1995) (describing blatant and
subtle prejudice); see also B. Zeus Simeoni, Testing Tests: Determination of the Efficacy of Prejudice Measures I (Spring 2005) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Georgia Southern University),
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthem.edu/etd/434.
296.
Simeoni, supra note 295, at 46-47. For example, the "Old Fashioned Racism Scale" may
include questions such as "Black people are generally not as smart as whites" and "It is a bad idea
for blacks and whites to marry one another." Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 54-75.
297.
See Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL &
298.
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 171 (2007) (collecting studies).
Id. at 183.
299.
Id. at 172-73 (collecting studies).
300.
Id. at 179 80.
301.
See Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implic302.
it Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190 (2010) [hereinafter Levinson et al., Guilty by
Implicit Racial Bias]; see also Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of
Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REv. 513,
548-49 (2014) [hereinafter Levinson et al., Devaluing Death].
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plicitly associated Black with guilty and White with not guilty' 3°3 in a
judicial setting, while another study concluded that juror interpretations
of ambiguous evidence "varied based upon whether they had been exposed to a photo of a darker- or lighter-skinned perpetrator" due to implicit racial-bias schemas. 30 4 Professor Jennifer Eberhardt has similarly
discovered that defendants with more "afro-centric" features were more
than twice as likely to receive the death penalty.30 5 The study reasoned
that it was possible that "jurors use[d] the degree to which... defendants
appear stereotypically black as a proxy for criminality, and then punish
accordingly."00 6 These findings indicate that the mere presence of juror
racial bias-whether explicit or implied-will likely serve as a significant motiving factor in a juror's decision to convict.
D. A Modelfor the JudicialInterpretationof Racial Bias

The relevance of sociological and psychological research for understanding juror racial bias cannot be overstated, given that the widespread7
30
existence of racial bias almost certainly skews juror decision-making.
If nearly all people are racially biased in ways that can influence jury
verdicts, then what becomes of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
fairness and an impartial jury in light of Peha-Rodriguez?30 8
One solution may be that judges must take affirmative steps to ameliorate the impact of racial bias at trial via modified voir dire questioning,
jury orientation materials, 30 9 jury instructions, "observation of juror demeanor and conduct during trial, juror reports before the verdict, and
nonjuror evidence after trial., 310 Indeed, the majority in Peha-Rodriguez
303.
Levinson et al., DevaluingDeath, supra note 302, at 550.
304.
Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit
Racial Bias, andJudgments ofAmbiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 337 (2010).
305.
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-SentencingOutcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 385-86 (2006).
306.
Lisa Trei, "Black" Features Can Sway in Favor of Death Penalty, According to Study,
STAN. REP. (May 3, 2006), https://news.stanford.edu/news/2006/may3/deathworthy-050306.html.
307.
See Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J. F. 406,
406 (2017).
308.
United States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 785 (6th Cir. 2017) (Donald, J., dissenting)
("Implicit biases threaten the very foundation of our criminal justice system. Our system is one that
is built on fairness. The right to a fair trial. The right to a trial by jury of one's peers. The right to be
assumed innocent until proven guilty. The prevalence of these biases that are so pervasive and involuntary erodes the rights that our Constitution aims to protect, and undermines the advances that our
society has made towards eliminating the role that race plays in our criminal justice system.").
309.
Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit JurorBias, 44
CONN. L. REV. 827, 831 (2012) (using empirical research to argue that a discussion of implicit bias
in juror orientation materials can reduce the impact of such bias).
310.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017); see also Levinson & Young,
supra note 304, at 309; Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock JurorDecision-Making:A MetaAnalytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 627-29 (2005) (finding that
racial bias impacted juror decision-making, which could be blunted by the type of juror instructions
provided); Regina A. Schuller et al., The Impact of PrejudiceScreening Procedures on Racial Bias
in the Courtroom, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 320, 320, 323 (2009) (finding an anti-black bias in juror
judgments of guilt, which could be lessened by use of reflective juror instructions that made racial
bias salient); Spiess, supra note 97, at 836-38.
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acknowledged that such trial safeguards can help prevent racial bias from
influencing jury decision-making. 31 However, the Court also held that
traditional safeguards may be "insufficient" to prevent juror racial bias,
312
An exand in some situations may exacerbate the expression of bias.
made
thus
be
must
held,
ception to the no-impeachment rule, the Court
13
3to
bias.
racial
juror
of
evidence
post-verdict
consider
to
allow trial judges
But how should trial judges determine when jurors' statements amount to
racial bias and whether those statements were a "significant motivating
factor" in their decision to convict? The sociological and psychological
research on racial bias provide a few guidelines for trial judges tasked
with applying the Peha-Rodriguez racial-bias exception:
1. Post-Verdict Procedure for Applying Peha-Rodriguez
A thorough and informed evidentiary hearing, considering not only
juror testimony but also scientific and specialized evidence on the nature
of racism and stereotyping,31 4 is the best way to uphold the constitutional
trial rights protected by Peha-Rodriguez. The sociological and psychological literature on racial bias supports this conclusion, given the complex ways in which such bias can be expressed.3 15 The procedure adopted
by the District Court of Minnesota in Smith is a step in the right direction. 3 16 The Smith court found that juror statements that did not explicitly
invoke race were nonetheless racially biased given their historical con3 17
In making this
nection to anti-African-American racial stereotypes.
determination, the Smith court rightly held an evidentiary hearing during
which juror testimony was elicited and secondary evidence (such as his18
torical and demographic data) was considered.3
Evidentiary hearings should involve, at a minimum, testimony from
both the juror(s) reporting the allegedly biased statement(s) and the juror(s) that allegedly made such statements.3 19 Courts should nonetheless
strive to interview all empaneled jurors when possible, such as when

137 S. Ct. at 869.
311.
Id. at 868.
312.
Id. at 869.
313.
See infra notes 319-23 and accompanying text.
314.
See supra Sections I1.B -C.
315.
See United States v. Smith, Crim. No. 12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *9 (D. Minn.
316.
Apr. 24, 2018).
Id.
317.
Id.
318.
United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the trial
319.
court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial, with the reporting
juror and the juror that made the allegedly biased statements testifying); Fisher v. State, 690 A.2d
917, 920 (Del. 1996) ("At the remand hearing each juror who deliberated in this case testified in
camerawith full right of examination and cross-examination by defense counsel and the prosecuting
attorney" when conducting post-verdict review of juror racial bias.). When appropriate, in camera
questioning of all empaneled jurors should take place to better promote the full sharing of information with the court.
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context is necessary to interpret an ambiguous juror statement. 32 Given
the difficulty trial courts have experienced in their attempt to identify
"clear statement(s) of racial bias," especially when confronted with
seemingly race-neutral juror statements, Pehia-Rodriguez evidentiary
hearings moving forward should also encourage pre-hearing briefings on
the issues by parties, 32' the presentation of relevant secondary evidence
(including scientific evidence on racial bias),322 and an allowance for
expert evidence when necessary. 323 Given the empirical evidence that
juror decision-making is already negatively impacted by racial bias, defendants should only need to demonstrate that a fair or reasonable inference of racial bias can be made from a juror statement to invoke the Peha-Rodriguez exception.
2. When Statements Clearly Indicate Racial Bias
The vast majority of courts applying Pehia-Rodriguez failed to thoroughly analyze whether a particular statement constituted a racial "slur"
or relied upon a racial stereotype. 324 Rather, the courts largely seemed to
reach a conclusion about whether a juror's statement was racially biased
with little to no analysis or reference to external evidence. 325 Allowing
courts to make such critical determinations on no more than a gut feeling
runs afoul of the evidentiary expectations of Peha-Rodriguez and the
demands of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Trial judges should
not rely on their ipse dixit about the presence or absence of racial bias,
but rather make an evidence-based finding within the context of a broad
post-verdict evidentiary hearing-relying on relevant social-science evi320.
See Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987); Commonwealth v. Laguer,
44 N.E.3d 869, 872 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016); State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110-11 (R.I. 2013). But
see Patton v. First Light Prop. Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-CV-1489-AJB-WVG, 2017 WL 5495104, at *7
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017) (holding that an evidentiary hearing in response to a juror affidavit was
not necessary), appealfiled,No. 17-56861 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2017).
321.
See, e.g., Smith, 2018 WL 1924454, at *4-5 (allowing parties to submit proposed findings
of fact and law prior to an evidentiary hearing featuring juror testimony).
322.
A handful of courts, like the majority in Pehia-Rodriguez, engaged in historical analysis
while attempting to determine whether juror statements portrayed racial bias. See Henley, 238 F.3d
at 1120 (stating that courts "have considerable difficulty accepting the government's assumption
that, at this time in our history, people who use the word 'nigger' are not racially biased."); Smith,
2018 WL 1924454, at *10; State v. Johnson, 630 N.W.2d 79, 85 (S.D. 2001) (finding the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based on juror racial bias, as
"the prejudicial remarks were of a severe nature that indirectly classified [the defendant] by his race
and invoked the prejudice associated with the historical treatment of African-American males who
have allegedly committed sexual improprieties with young Caucasian girls.").
323.
Expert testimony or reports may be especially helpful to the racial-bias analysis when
seemingly race-neutral or "non-racial" juror statements are at issue, as experts would be able to call
upon a "specialized body of knowledge" to educate the court about the non-obvious ways in which
modem racism may manifest. See supra Sections III.B-C; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.
324.
See, e.g., Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1158 59 (holding that without substantial likelihood of
prejudice, the court will confirm the findings of the state court without assessing existence of racial
stereotypes and stressing that the limited, proper role of federal courts is to question whether the
state court violated law). But see, e.g., Smith, 2018 WL 1924454, at *10 (utilizing secondary sources
and an appeal to history to analyze the presence of racial bias).
325.
See, e.g., Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1156-60 (neglecting to evaluate external or secondary
sources to confirm the likelihood of prejudice resulting from the juror statements at issue).
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dence-upon a plausible allegation of juror racial bias. In so doing,
courts should heed the lessons of sociological and psychological research
on racial bias, taking into account the structural and systemic nature of
racism.
The social science research also demonstrates that juror statements
that are race neutral or ambiguous can still constitute racial bias, contrary
to the holdings of the few courts that have rejected Peha-Rodriguez requests on the grounds that the statements were "non-racial,, 326 "race neu,,327,,328
Juror statements that lead to a "clear" infertral, '327 or "ambiguous.
ence of racial bias should be allowed to trigger post-verdict review,
whether they are race regarding or race neutral on their face, since they
still amount to cultural, aversive, or symbolic racism. Judges should
make generous use of psychometric racism "scales," such as the aforementioned Modem Racism Scale, Old Fashioned Racism Scale, Blatant
Prejudice Scale, and Subtle Prejudice Scale, 329 to glean examples of biased statements to use during their analysis. Based on the existing sociological and psychological research on racial bias, judges should consider
asking the following questions when analyzing claims of juror racial
bias:
"

Does the statement invoke a blatant or explicit racial slur or stereotype?

*

Does the statement otherwise rely on or promote a race-based
stereotype?

"

Does statement permit an inference of white superiority or
nonwhite inferiority?

"

Does the statement permit an inference of racial biological difference?

"

Does the statement rationalize racial inequality or view it as a
natural occurrence?

"

Does the statement promote the idea that racial differences can
be attributed to a poor work ethic, laziness, or other "cultural"
factors?

*

Does the statement refer to the race of the defendant, victim or a
witness in a nondescriptive fashion?

326.
327.
328.
issue are
329.

Id.at 1160.
State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1112 (R.I. 2013).
See id. at 1107, 1110-11 (confirming the trial court's conclusion that the statements at
not racist and describing the behavior at issue as "ambiguous").
See supra note 295.
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3. When Racial Bias Is a Significant Motivating Factor in
Decision-Making
The Pehia-Rodriguez Court did not set forth any guidelines for deciding when a statement of juror racial bias should be viewed as supporting an inference that such bias influenced the juror's vote to convict. The
Court did, however, provide that the issue of whether a statement of racial bias "was a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict" depended on whether the statement "cast serious doubt on the fair330
ness and impartiality of the jury's deliberations and resulting verdict."
The Court also provided some clues based on its own holding on the case
facts by finding that the mere fact that the juror statements espoused racial stereotypes meant that they were necessarily "egregious and unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias.",331 The Court further noted that it
was permissible for courts to find the racial-bias exception satisfied if
there were findings that racial bias "pervaded the ... room" 332 or based
on the presence of just "[o]ne racist juror. ' 0 3 3 The sociological and psy-

chological research on racial bias support this conclusion, as empirical
studies have found that the mere presence
of individual racial bias invar334
iably influences juror decision-making.
Trial courts should thus find that racially biased statements significantly motivated a juror's vote to convict if the statement involves racial
bias and it either was made (1) during an effort to deliberate on the defendant's guilt or (2) as part of an effort to influence the vote of other
jurors. Arguably, the simple making of a racially biased statement within
the context of (and related to) juror deliberations should satisfy this
standard .
CONCLUSION

The presence of racial bias in the jury room not only violates core
trial rights contained in our Constitution but undermines public faith in
the continued democratic functioning of our society. The Supreme
Court's identification of a racial-bias exception to the no-impeachmerit
rule represents an important step in restoring trust in a broken criminal
justice system by upholding the defendant's constitutional right to a fair
and impartial jury. Due to the pervasiveness of racism in society, it may
330.
Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 859 (2017).
331.
Id. at 870.
332.
Id. at 871 (quoting Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987)).
333.
Id. (quoting United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1I11, 1120 (9th Cir. 2013)).
334.
See, e.g., Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 302, at 188-90; Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 302, at 549-50; Levinson & Young, supra note 304, at
309-10.
335.
See United States v. Smith, Crim. No. 12-183 (SRN), 2018 WL 1924454, at *10 (D.
Minn. Apr. 24, 2018) (finding juror statements indicating that the African-American defendant was a
"banger from the hood" were sufficient evidence that "'racial animus was a significant motivating
factor in the juror's vote to convict' . . . because ...

it directly ties a race-based stereotype to ... the

[juror's] conclusion of guilt" and was made while jury deliberations were ongoing).
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take some time to fulfill the promise of Peha-Rodriguez to a jury free
from racial bias. Courts can hasten the process of removing racial bias
from juries, however, by (1) incorporating the lessons of sociological and
psychological research in their rulings on Peha-Rodriguez post-verdict
motions and (2) conducting thorough evidentiary hearings when confronted with claims of juror racial bias. The judicial recognition that racism is multivaried in expression and systemic in nature is critical to future progress in removing "the taint of racism" from our courtrooms.

